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This Article makes several boldly novel claims. It presents 
an original understanding of the United States Constitution 
that seems to have been forgotten. This understanding is predi-
cated on the assumption that the national government is a sov-
ereign government and that Congress, as a sovereign legisla-
ture, possesses the legislative powers that sovereign 
legislatures possess. I call this theory inherent national sover-
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eignty constitutionalism. This theory of the Constitution de-
fined “enumerated powers” not only semantically, but as a list 
of powers the Constitution delegates to Congress and to which 
Congress is limited. Adherents of inherent national sovereignty 
also understood “enumerated powers” as a statement of ends 
and objects for which Congress may exercise its inherent legis-
lative powers. In addition to the enumerated powers of Article 
I, the inherent national sovereignty theory also understood the 
Constitution’s Preamble and other clauses that might require 
federal action as additional delegations of ends and objects that 
authorize the federal government to exercise its inherent legis-
lative powers to achieve. 
According to the inherent national sovereignty theory, 
Congress, like the British Parliament after which it was some-
what modeled, possesses the primary authority to interpret the 
Constitution, including the scope of its legislative powers and 
the discretion of when and how to exercise them. Proponents of 
this theory consequently understood the Constitution as a dy-
namically evolving framework of government whose meaning 
would develop over time through the political process and the 
specific actions taken by Congress and the executive branch of 
the federal government. When the meaning of a constitutional 
clause or power was disputed or was ambiguous, advocates of 
inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism looked to Con-
gress to resolve the dispute or to clarify the ambiguity by inter-
preting the disputed text in accord with other clauses of the 
Constitution and/or relevant political practice. Ultimately, 
however, the people are the final authority and arbiters of con-
stitutional meaning, as this understanding is predicated on the 
theory of popular sovereignty. 
The inherent national sovereignty theory of American con-
stitutionalism relegated the Supreme Court to a secondary, 
deferential role in interpreting constitutional meaning and the 
scope of constitutional powers. Its role was to affirm the consti-
tutionality of congressional laws unless Congress’s action is ex-
plicitly prohibited or explicitly reserved to the states or to the 
people. The Court, in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, 
was authorized to void an act of Congress only if the act was a 
“bold and plain usurpation” of legislative power.1 In the opinion 
credited with creating the Supreme Court’s power of judicial 
review, Marbury v. Madison, the Chief Justice repeatedly spoke 
 
 1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). 
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of a congressional act as “repugnant” to the Constitution before 
the Constitution authorized the Court to void the act.2 Indeed, 
the Chief grounded the Court’s power of judicial review, in part, 
on a theory of inherent judicial power when he stated that “[i]t 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is.”3 
The nature of inherent national sovereignty constitutional-
ism just described appears to be oxymoronic. The ideas of in-
herent powers and constitutionally delegated powers appear to 
be mutually exclusive. How can a government possess inherent 
powers and also be limited to delegated powers? Even propo-
nents of inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism readi-
ly acknowledged that the United States government is a gov-
ernment of limited powers, of constitutionally delegated 
powers. They reconciled these two apparently irreconcilable 
ideas by limiting the federal government’s authority to exercise 
inherent sovereign powers to those that are appropriate to 
achieve the objects and ends delegated to the federal govern-
ment in the enumerated powers of Article I, the Preamble, and 
other clauses in the Constitution. 
Proponents of inherent national sovereignty constitutional-
ism asserted this understanding of the Constitution in support 
of congressional legislation that was opposed by advocates of 
another “original” understanding of American Constitutional-
ism. Many early Americans asserted a states’ rights oriented, 
strict construction constitutionalism and insisted that the 
meaning of the Constitution’s text is fixed and should be strict-
ly interpreted to limit the powers of the national government to 
those that are enumerated in Article I and those unenumerated 
powers required to carry enumerated powers into effect. It is 
this strict construction constitutionalism that today’s “new 
originalists” claim to be the original understanding of the Con-
stitution.4 
But the assertion of inherent national sovereignty constitu-
tionalism in the political and legislative debates in our early 
history over the meaning of the Constitution and how and by 
whom the Constitution should be interpreted is irrefutable evi-
dence that strict construction constitutionalism was not the on-
 
 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138, 176, 177, 180 (1803). 
 3. Id. at 177. 
 4. There is substantial scholarly literature on the New Originalism. See 
for example the works cited in the papers published in Symposium, The New 
Originalism in Constitutional Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (2013). 
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ly original understanding of the Constitution. Today’s “new 
originalists” use a theory of constitutional construction that is 
founded on an assumption that is contradicted by the historical 
evidence presented within, namely, that they are embracing an 
understanding of the Constitution that was the general under-
standing of the Constitution. Moreover, proponents of inherent 
national sovereignty constitutionalism often won these consti-
tutional debates. Indeed, the Federalist Party of Alexander 
Hamilton, the principal initial proponents of inherent national 
sovereignty constitutionalism, dominated the federal govern-
ment from 1789 to 1800, and their theory of the Constitution 
was adopted in Congress and embraced by the Supreme Court 
on occasions long after they ceased to exist. 
This Article will demonstrate that early Congresses and 
presidential administrations asserted the inherent national 
sovereignty theory and applied it as constitutional authority for 
actual decisions they made and actions they took by examining 
the debates around Congress’s incorporation of the First and 
Second Banks of the United States. Proponents of these corpo-
rations rejected opponents’ argument that Congress, as a legis-
lature whose powers are limited to those enumerated in Article 
I, semantically understood, does not possess the power of incor-
poration because this power is not expressly or even impliedly 
delegated to Congress. Bank proponents answered that Con-
gress, as a sovereign legislature, possesses the power of incor-
poration as one of the sovereign powers that inheres in all sov-
ereign governments. However, bank proponents acknowledged 
that Congress may exercise this power only to achieve the ends 
or objects delegated to it by the Constitution. They thereby rec-
onciled the government’s inherent sovereign powers with the 
theory that its powers are limited to those delegated by the 
Constitution. They consequently distinguished the federal gov-
ernment as a government of limited powers from the sovereign 
governments of other nation-states that are authorized to exer-
cise their sovereign powers generally, without such limitations. 
The research on which this Article is based yields another 
striking revelation regarding the validity of original under-
standings of the Constitution, namely, that constitutional in-
terpretations were as much an expression of economic, finan-
cial, geographical, and political interests as they were 
intellectual commitments to textual meanings and constitu-
tional values. This will be seen in the interpretations of specific 
individuals and groups, such as James Madison and the Demo-
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cratic Republican Party that he, with Thomas Jefferson, found-
ed, as well as Hamilton’s Federalists, who asserted or opposed 
constitutional interpretations at one moment in time and then 
adopted opposite interpretations at a later time when the 
change served their interests. The practical necessity for con-
gressional action to meet a particular national need or a de-
sired national objective often determined individuals’ under-
standings of the Constitution and of congressional power; at 
times practical necessity overrode individuals’ doubts regarding 
the Constitution’s delegation of legislative authority for a par-
ticular action. The evidence presented in this Article strongly 
suggests that, when the federal government was up and run-
ning and political decisions had to be made, original under-
standings of the Constitution served as political arguments to 
support or to oppose specific interests more than they reflected 
principled interpretations of constitutional meanings. The ma-
nipulation of constitutional meaning to advance individual and 
group interests raises serious doubts regarding the propriety 
and validity of binding contemporary interpretations of consti-
tutional texts to their assumed original understandings. 
This Article examines certain political actions of the found-
ing generation and its immediate successors that reveal how 
these historical actors interpreted and applied the Constitution 
in actually governing the new nation. It focuses on the debates 
leading to the incorporation of the First Bank of the United 
States in 1791, its expiration in 1810–11, the incorporation of 
the Second Bank of the United States in 1815–16, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland upholding 
Congress’s inherent sovereign power of incorporation in 1819. 
These debates present case studies of how the members of the 
three branches of the U.S. government understood the process 
of constitutional government, the role of constitutional inter-
pretation in this governing process, Congress as the primary 
authority to interpret the Constitution, and how the federal 
government exercised constitutional power in actually govern-
ing. 
This Article also contends that Chief Justice John Mar-
shall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, which many scholars 
consider to be the most important opinion in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s history,5 has been misinterpreted by scholars and the 
 
 5. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch: Banking on Na-
tional Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 33 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009) 
(reporting that McCulloch was cited in over 2400 cases as of January 1, 2009). 
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Court. The constitutional theories expressed in the political de-
bates relating to the incorporation of the two national banks 
presented in this Article have been overlooked by scholars and 
by jurists, but this Article demonstrates that they are indispen-
sable to an accurate understanding of Marshall’s opinion and 
the Court’s decision in McCulloch. Placed in the context of the-
se debates, one can see that Chief Justice Marshall and the 
unanimous Supreme Court adopted the inherent national sov-
ereignty theory of the Constitution and affirmed Congress’s 
power of incorporation as one of its inherent sovereign powers 
that bank proponents had successfully argued in Congress to 
support the incorporation of the national banks. 
Part I of this Article reviews the congressional debates over 
Congress’s power to incorporate the First Bank in 1791. Part II 
recounts the debate in President George Washington’s cabinet 
among Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and Alexander 
Hamilton. Part III analyzes the congressional debates relating 
to the failed effort to extend the Bank’s charter in 1810–11. 
Part IV analyzes the congressional debates over the incorpora-
tion of the Second Bank in 1815–16 and President James Madi-
son’s support for this measure. Part V examines the lawyers’ 
arguments and Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch 
v. Maryland. 
I.  THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES & 
CONGRESS 1791   
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S BANK 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
To understand the constitutional significance of the First 
and Second Banks of the United States, one must know some-
thing of their joint governmentally and privately owned corpo-
rate structures, the roles they were to play in the nation’s eco-
nomic and financial sectors, and the political divisions relating 
to them. The First Bank of the United States was proposed by 
Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury during Presi-
dent George Washington’s first administration, in December 
1790. It was part of Hamilton’s economic plan, endorsed by the 
Federalists, to develop the United States into a powerful com-
mercial and prosperous mixed economy. Subsistence and com-
mercial farming were the primary economic activities at the 
time. Hamilton’s economic plan was designed to develop the 
manufacturing, financial, and commercial sectors of the econo-
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my and to secure a system of public credit.6 
A national banking industry hardly existed in 1790 when 
Hamilton proposed the national bank.7 Only four commercial 
banks existed in the U.S. at the time: the Bank of North Ameri-
ca in Philadelphia, chartered by the Continental Congress in 
1781, and state-chartered banks in New York City, Boston, and 
Baltimore.8 Most Americans were unfamiliar with banks, how 
they functioned, and the roles they could play in a dynamic, 
capitalist economy.9 But Hamilton understood a national bank’s 
importance to the development of the American economy and 
the financial operations of the national government.10 
Hamilton explained how banks could increase the sum of 
circulating money beyond its capital in specie and thereby in-
crease the active capital of the nation.11 In expanding the na-
tion’s money supply, banks generated employment, expanded 
labor and industry, and promoted the production of goods for 
export, which, in turn, generated a favorable balance of trade 
and consequent increase in the nation’s quantity of gold and 
silver.12 A national bank, Hamilton argued, could thereby “en-
large the mass of industrious and commercial enterprise [and 
assist them to] become nurseries of national wealth”—a “conse-
quence as satisfactorily verified by experience, as it is clearly 
 
 6. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114–15 (1957); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MAR-
KET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–1846, at 3–27 (1991); GORDON 
S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–
1815, at 98–99 (2009). 
 7. See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 114. 
 8. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 114. 
 11. See WOOD, supra note 6, at 98. 
 12. LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 15–30 (com-
piled by M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall, 1832). The debates of the U.S. Sen-
ate were not recorded and are not known. The compilers of this legislative and 
documentary history claim they collected “the entire proceedings, debates, and 
resolutions,” of both houses of Congress, concerning the national bank, includ-
ing reports of committees and public officers relating to the establishment, 
constitutionality, and public uses of the bank. Id. at iii. They explain that, to 
the extent a record of the proceedings and debates exists at all, “it is in the 
pages of the gazettes of the day.” Id. For these proceedings and debates the 
compilers relied on the files of the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, which they as-
sert furnish “the most correct sources of information.” Id. at iv. Nevertheless, 
they did not include the Senate debates relating to the bank bill. 
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deducible in theory.”13 
A bank was also useful to the government in acquiring cap-
ital, especially in sudden emergencies, Hamilton continued.14 A 
bank would facilitate the payment of taxes by extending loans 
to taxpayers who needed them.15 It would be the sole depository 
of government funds, but it would also hold deposits of private 
individuals, both of which enabled the First Bank to create a 
circulating medium of exchange, or paper money, in the form of 
promissory notes payable to bearer based on the bank’s depos-
its.16 A bank’s capacity to increase the quantity of money would 
not only assist individuals in paying taxes, it would also assist 
them in satisfying their other monetary needs and help them in 
any business in which “money is an agent.”17 It would also ena-
ble the government “to answer any exigencies” arising in the 
foreign trade of merchants and other enterprises.18 A national 
bank would serve the commercial interests of the nation as well 
as the financial needs of the U.S. government.19 
The First Bank would be jointly owned by the U.S. gov-
ernment and private investors.20 Jointly owned and govern-
ment-subsidized enterprises were common in the early U.S.21 
States owned and even operated banks they chartered, and 
they often owned shares in and bought the bonds of turnpike 
companies, canal companies, insurance companies, and rail-
roads.22 State ownership of companies declined shortly before 
the Civil War as their investments turned sour in the wake of 
 
 13. Id. at 17. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191–96. 
 17. Clarke & Hall, supra note 12, at 18. 
 18. Id. at 23. 
 19. Id. 
 20. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98. 
 21. See STUART BRUCHEY, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
1607–1861, at 112–40 (1968); LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMO-
CRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776–1860, at 82–104 (1948); JOHN 
LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND 
THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 6 
(2001); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERN-
MENT AND THE ECONOMY, 1820–1861, at 296 (1969); GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, 
THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1815–1860, at 92–96 (1951); RICHARD 
WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
AMERICA 26–27 (2011). 
 22. See BRUCHEY, supra note 21; LARSON, supra note 21; TAYLOR, supra 
note 21. 
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the economic depression of 1837.23 The national government al-
so financed and subsidized companies engaged in water and 
land transportation, such as steamboats and railroads.24 The 
national government heavily subsidized railroad development 
before and after the Civil War.25 
Returning to the First Bank, the U.S. government contrib-
uted one-fifth of the bank’s capital of $10 million and owned 
one-fifth of the outstanding stock; private investors bought the 
remaining four-fifths of the outstanding stock.26 The latter were 
authorized to acquire up to three-fourths of the stock with gov-
ernment securities, but they were required to pay for the re-
maining one-fourth with gold or silver.27 
The First Bank was chartered for a period of twenty 
years.28 The bank was located in Philadelphia, but it was au-
thorized to establish branches in other cities.29 The First Bank 
eventually established branches in eight other cities.30 
B. THE BANK BILL IN THE U.S. SENATE 1791 
Unfortunately, the Senate debates relating to the Senate’s 
adoption of the bank bill were not recorded. The bill was re-
ported to the Senate on January 3, 1791, and it was debated 
over the next two and one-half weeks.31 Senator William 
Maclay commented on the senate debates in his diary, but his 
entries are not very detailed.32 He mentioned that the issue of 
Congress’s authority to charter the bank might have been in-
quired into, but apparently Congress’s authority was not an is-
sue since “the old [Continental] Congress enjoyed” and exer-
cised this authority when it chartered the Bank of North 
 
 23. See LARSON, supra note 21, at 195–224. 
 24. See id. at 109–48. 
 25. See WHITE, supra note 21. 
 26. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98. 
 27. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 2, 3 Stat. 191, 192. 
 28. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98. 
 29. Id. 
 30. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 127. Branches were opened in Boston, 
New York, Baltimore, and Charleston in 1792; Norfolk, Virginia in 1800; 
Washington, D.C. and Savannah in 1802; and New Orleans in 1805. Id. 
 31. See The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates 
(March 4, 1789–March 3, 1781), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 355, 356–65 (Ken-
neth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
 32. See id. 
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America in 1781.33 This suggests that senators assumed legisla-
tive precedent determined issues of constitutional construction, 
a doctrine of national sovereignty constitutionalism. Maclay al-
so noted that there was a group of senators, whom he dubbed 
“[t]he Potowmack interest,” who sought to destroy the bank bill 
because they feared that the bank, “in the hands of the Phila-
delphians, might retard the removal of Congress” to a location 
on the Potomac River.34 This entry reveals another aspect of 
constitutional construction in the early republic: economic, geo-
graphical, and partisan interests shaped views of the Constitu-
tion perhaps as much as commitment to constitutional princi-
ples. The Senate passed the bank bill on January 20, 1791, 
without a roll call and sent it to the House of Representatives.35 
C. THE BANK BILL IN THE HOUSE 
1. Economic and Geographical Interests and the First Bank 
The House debates are recorded in the Annals of Congress. 
However, organized as a committee of the whole, the House 
considered the bank bill without anyone rising in opposition 
until Representative James Jackson of Georgia, who opposed 
the bill, asked the House to recommit the bill to committee.36 
His opposition confirmed the observation made by Representa-
tive Michael Stone of Maryland later in the debates that indi-
viduals were influenced in their views of government policy by 
“habits of thinking by our local situations, and, perhaps, the 
distinct interests of the States we represent.”37 Consequently, 
opinions regarding the constitutionality of this bill, Repre-
sentative Stone opined, “seem to be divided by a geographical 
line,” and “other considerations [are] mixed with the [bank] 
question,” such as the future location of the capitol and the 
ways in which the general government affected the economic 
interests of different groups.38 Stone then confirmed his obser-
 
 33. Id. at 347. 
 34. Id. at 364. 
 35. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 116. 
 36. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1891 (1791) (statement of Rep. Jackson). 
 37. Id. at 1930 (statement of Rep. Stone). 
 38. Id.; see also id. at 1891 (statement of Rep. Jackson) (arguing that a 
national bank would only benefit the mercantile class). Southerners feared 
that a national bank located in Philadelphia might become an insurmountable 
obstacle to their desire to move the nation’s capitol to the Potomac River. See 
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 229 (1993); 
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vation by opposing the bank bill, in part, because a national 
bank would “give ‘partial advantages’ to the States,” contrary to 
the Constitution.39 He also objected that it would create a mon-
eyed interest “at the devotion of Government” and that it would 
“swallow up the State banks.”40 
The economic interests of Representative Jackson’s con-
stituents led him to oppose the bank bill, and evidently in-
formed his constitutional arguments. Jackson argued that the 
Bank would benefit only a small portion of the American popu-
lation: the mercantile elite.41 Farmers and yeomanry, such as 
his constituents, would benefit not at all.42 Jackson correctly 
identified the intended beneficiaries of the First Bank; he was 
also correct in asserting that the First Bank would not benefit 
farmers.43 Representative William Giles of Virginia also op-
posed the bank, in part because it favored Philadelphia over 
other port cities in violation of the provision in the Constitution 
that prohibits giving any preference by the regulation of com-
merce or revenue to the ports of one state over another.44 
Scholars have long recognized that economic and geograph-
ical interests shaped partisan interests which significantly in-
fluenced how the Constitution was interpreted as well as the 
constitutional positions legislators argued regarding the bank 
bill.45 The House votes on chartering the First Bank reflected 
 
Kenneth R. Bowling, The Bank Bill, The Capital City and President Washing-
ton, in 1 CAPITOL STUDIES NO. 1, at 59 (1972). However, Benjamin B. Klubes 
rejects this view in The First Federal Congress and the First National Bank: A 
Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 19, 27 n.19 
(1990). 
 39. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1936 (1791) (statement of Rep. Stone). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1891 (statement of Rep. Jackson). 
 42. Id. For a discussion of the question whether the bank would favor spe-
cial interests or the nation’s general welfare, see infra, notes 233–44 and ac-
companying text . 
 43. See WOOD, supra note 6, at 99 (stating that the bank did not want to 
make short-term mortgage loans to farmers); 2 DUMAS MALONE, Jefferson and 
the Rights of Man, in JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 340 (1951) (stating that the 
doubts farmers had about the bank were borne out by experience). 
 44. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1940 (1791) (statement of Rep. Giles). The clause 
in the Constitution Representative Giles was referring to is Article I, Section 
9, Clause 6, which states in relevant part: “No Preference shall be given by 
any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of 
another.” 
 45. See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 115–18; Charles A. Beard, Historiog-
raphy and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 159, 161–
66 (Conyers Read ed., 1938); Klubes, supra note 38, at 20–28. 
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geographical groupings. Of the thirty-nine votes in favor of the 
bank, thirty-three were from the states comprising New Eng-
land and the states of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylva-
nia, states with the largest commercial cities and the greatest 
proportion of incipient manufactures.46 Fifteen of the twenty 
votes against the bank bill came from the states of Virginia, 
North and South Carolina, and Georgia, states that remained 
mostly rural and local.47 It is also important to remember that 
the bank bill was a politically partisan issue, with Federalists 
generally supporting it and opponents eventually forming the 
Jeffersonian or Democratic Republican Party.48 Constitutional 
interpretation on both sides was influenced by these economic, 
geographic and partisan interests. 
2. Congress’s Inherent Sovereign Power To Provide for the 
Nation’s Needs and Exigencies 
One of the main constitutional arguments the bank bill’s 
proponents asserted in favor of its enactment was the theory 
that Congress possessed inherent sovereign powers to meet na-
tional needs and exigencies and to accomplish the objects for 
which the Constitution was adopted, regardless whether the 
requisite sovereign powers were enumerated in Article I or 
could be implied from any enumerated power. Like Treasury 
Secretary Hamilton, bank supporters argued that a national 
bank was necessary to promote the nation’s economy, one of the 
purposes for which the Constitution was established, and that 
it was indispensable to serve the government’s financial needs 
in times of crises.49 For example, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts 
explained that the new capital of the bank “will invigorate 
trade and manufactures with new energy. It will furnish a me-
dium for the collection of revenues; and if Government should 
be pressed by a sudden necessity, it will afford seasonable and 
effectual aid.”50 Ames asserted that these considerations made 
the establishment of a bank not simply a question of expedien-
cy but of duty.51 
 
 46. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 117. 
 47. Id. Charleston, South Carolina, was an important commercial city, 
however. 
 48. See id. at 118–22. 
 49. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903 (statement of Rep. Ames); see also infra 
notes 130–47 and accompanying text (Hamilton’s arguments). 
 50. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903 (statement of Rep. Ames). 
 51. See id. 
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The discussion that follows will show that supporters and 
opponents asserted different understandings of the nature of 
Congress’s legislative powers and the powers enumerated in 
Article I of the Constitution. Bank opponents argued the states-
rights-centered, strict construction theory of the Constitution 
and insisted that Congress’s legislative powers are fixed and 
limited to the enumerated powers. Some conceded that Con-
gress may also exercise unspecified powers, but they limited 
these implied powers to those without which Congress could 
not carry into execution its enumerated powers.52 The issues for 
them, therefore, were the semantic meaning of an enumerated 
power and whether the proposed legislative action could be un-
derstood to be within the meaning of and essential to the exer-
cise of this power. Opponents’ understanding of enumerated 
and implied powers was essentially definitional and abstract 
rather than pragmatic. Thus, Representative Michael Stone of 
Maryland rejected an argument by Representative Theodore 
Sedgwick of Massachusetts that Congress’s power to charter a 
bank is implied in the government’s delegated powers to borrow 
money and to lay and collect taxes.53 Stone explained that char-
tering a bank is not the usual means of borrowing money or of 
collecting taxes.54 
3. The Doctrine of Congress’s Inherent Sovereign Authority To 
Legislate 
In contrast to opponents, bank supporters understood 
enumerated powers, along with the Constitution’s Preamble 
and other provisions, as delegations of ends or objects for which 
Congress possesses the powers of any sovereign nation to ac-
complish. Representative Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts ar-
gued in support of Congress’s power to charter a bank based on 
its inherent sovereign legislative powers.55 Popular sovereignty 
was the predicate for this inherent power theory. Referring to 
the Constitution as “the great law of the people, who are them-
selves the sovereign Legislature,” Gerry quoted the Preamble to 
the Constitution, and declared: “These are the objects for which 
the Constitution was established, and in administering it we 
should always keep them in view.”56 The “common sense” of 
 
 52. For example, see id. at 1940–41 (statement of Rep. Stone). 
 53. Id. at 1934. 
 54. Id. at 1934–35. 
 55. Id. at 1946–48 (statement of Rep. Gerry). 
 56. Id. at 1947–48. 
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these terms, Gerry opined, dictates the measures to achieve 
these objects, “for the security of our property, families, and 
liberty—of everything dear to us, depends on our ability to de-
fend them.”57 
Representative John Lawrence of New York argued that 
the government’s ends are broader than the objects specified in 
the Preamble. They “are contained in the context of the Consti-
tution” generally.58 Asserting a theory of inherent sovereign 
power, he inferred that “every power necessary to secure these 
[objects] must necessarily follow” from them.59 Looking back to 
the deficiencies and powerlessness of the Continental Congress, 
he asserted that it was “to capacitate the Government of the 
United States, and [to] form a more perfect union, [that] the 
Constitution” was adopted.60 To deny Congress the power to en-
act legislation to achieve any of its purposes for which the Con-
stitution was adopted “involves the grossest absurdity,” Law-
rence insisted.61 
Representative Elias Boudinot of New Jersey cited Alexan-
der Hamilton’s Federalist No. 23 and declared that no argu-
ment of the same length “could more forcibly and pointedly elu-
cidate and prove the construction contended for in support of 
the bill on the table.”62 In this number, Hamilton identified 
some of the “principal purposes” for which the U.S. was estab-
lished, but he focused on national defense to illustrate his theo-
ry of the national government’s inherent sovereign powers to 
accomplish its purposes and to meet national exigencies.63 
Hamilton declared that “[t]hese powers ought to exist without 
limitation.”64 The reason is that the circumstances that may 
endanger the nation’s safety are infinite, and “it is impossible to 
 
 57. Id. at 1948. 
 58. Id. at 1914–15 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). 
 59. Id. at 1915. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1926 (statement of Rep. Boudinot). 
 63. The national purposes Hamilton listed are: the common defense; 
preservation of the peace as well against “internal convulsions as external at-
tacks”; the regulation of commerce with other nations and among the states; 
and the “superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with 
foreign countries.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 64. Id. Hamilton included the following powers: raising an army; building 
and equipping a fleet; prescribing rules for the governance of each; directing 
their operation; providing for their support. Id. 
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foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, 
and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which 
may be necessary to satisfy them.”65 Consequently, “[Congress’s] 
power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combina-
tions of such circumstances.”66 The circumstances that may cre-
ate a national exigency are unlimited and cannot be anticipat-
ed.67 Consequently, the national government should be 
entrusted with all of the powers “a free people ought to delegate 
to any government,” and that are sufficient “for the manage-
ment of our NATIONAL INTERESTS.”68 
Based on Hamilton’s Federalist No. 23, Boudinot asserted 
conceptions of the Constitution that Chief Justice Marshall 
employed in his McCulloch opinion: an enumeration in the 
Constitution of every power Congress might exercise would 
take on the prolixity of a legal code, and a developmental con-
ception of the Constitution expanding Congress’s legislative 
powers to meet unforeseen circumstances.69 Boudinot stated 
that “it was universally understood that whenever a general 
power was given, especially to a supreme Legislature, every 
necessary means to carry it into execution were [sic] necessari-
ly included.”70 This was the universal understanding of man-
kind, “without which it would require a multitude of volumes to 
contain the original powers of an increasing Government that 
must necessarily be changing its relative situation every year 
or two.”71 It is important to keep in mind that Boudinot’s theory 
of “general power” included inherent sovereign powers to ac-
complish the objects and ends for which the Constitution was 
ratified and the national government established, in particular, 
to provide for the general welfare.72 
 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 156. 
 69. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1924, 1925–28 (1791) (statement of Rep. 
Boudinot). 
 70. Id. at 1925. 
 71. Id. For Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in McCulloch, see infra 
notes 391–94 and accompanying text. 
 72. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1925 (1791) (statement of Rep. Boudinot); see 
also infra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
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4. Bank Opponents Reject Supporters’ National Sovereignty 
Theory 
Opponents of the bank bill acknowledged proponents’ in-
herent national sovereignty theory in support of Congress’s im-
plied power to charter a corporation, and they rejected it. Rep-
resentative Stone observed that several supporters thought “all 
Governments, instituted for certain ends, draw to them the 
means of execution as of common right.”73 Reading the Consti-
tution’s Preamble, he declared: “Here is your Constitution! 
Here is your bill of rights!”74 He suggested that supporters of 
the bank bill needed nothing more “respecting the powers of 
Congress, than a description of the ends of Government.”75 
Stone asked rhetorically, “I would ask if there is any power un-
der Heaven which could not be exercised within the extensive 
limits of this preamble?”76 Under the bank proponents’ doctrine, 
the Constitution’s enumerated powers would become a dead 
letter. Under their doctrine of implied powers, Stone objected, 
there was no need to specify the powers to accomplish “the ends 
mentioned in the preamble.”77 James Madison also rejected the 
idea that the Preamble was a source of Congress’s legislative 
powers, stating that “the preamble only states the objects of the 
Confederation, and the subsequent clauses designate the ex-
press powers by which those objects are to be obtained.”78 
D. CONFLICTING THEORIES OF INDEPENDENT AND SUBSTANTIVE 
SOVEREIGN POWERS 
Madison made an elaborate argument against the theory of 
independent and substantive powers implied from the sover-
eign nature of the national government that bank supporters 
were arguing Congress may exercise to accomplish the ends or 
objects stated in the Preamble. He distinguished between pow-
ers “necessary and proper for the Government or Union,” which 
he characterized as “expressly enumerated,” and powers that 
were “necessary and proper for executing the enumerated pow-
ers,” which he asserted “were included in the enumerated pow-
 
 73. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1931 (statement of Rep. Stone). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1931. 
 77. Id. Representative William Giles of Virginia also made the same 
points. See id. at 1937–45 (statement of Rep. Giles). 
 78. Id. at 1957 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
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ers [and] were not expressed, but [were] to be drawn from the 
nature of each.”79 This enumeration of substantive sovereign 
powers “constituted the peculiar nature of the [U.S.] Govern-
ment; no [independent and substantive] power, therefore, not 
enumerated could be inferred from the general nature of Gov-
ernment.”80 Madison illustrated this distinction by noting that, 
had the framers failed to enumerate the power to make trea-
ties, the national government would not have been able to 
make treaties without a constitutional amendment granting 
this power, however lamentable this failure might have been.81 
From his theory of sovereign and independent powers and 
implied powers, Madison argued that Congress did not have 
the power to charter a national bank. The power to charter a 
corporation “could never be deemed . . . a means of executing 
another power,” he insisted.82 The power of incorporation “was 
in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive pre-
rogative, which not being enumerated in the Constitution, 
could never have been meant to be included in it, and not being 
included, could never be rightfully exercised” by Congress.83 “By 
exercising this power and creating a bank,” Madison argued, 
this bill would create “an artificial person, previously not exist-
ing in law. It confers important civil rights and attributes, 
which could not otherwise be claimed.”84 
Additionally, the corporation thus created would supersede 
and infringe the sovereign rights of the states. It was “a power 
. . .  obnoxious to the States, whose laws would then be super-
seded, not only by the laws of Congress, but by the by-laws of a 
corporation within their own jurisdiction.”85 This power also 
substantively affected the rights of the individual. “It involves a 
monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen. It 
leads to a penal regulation, perhaps capital punishments, one 
of the most solemn acts of sovereign authority.”86 From this 
perspective, Madison concluded, the power of incorporation 
 
 79. Id. at 1900. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1900–01. 
 82. Id. at 1900. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1899–1900. 
 85. Id. at 1900. 
 86. Id. 
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could never be considered an incidental means to carry into ex-
ecution an enumerated power.87 
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts rebutted Madison’s argu-
ments with a powerful argument of his own based on a similar 
hypothetical that demonstrated the need for Congress to exer-
cise an unenumerated substantive, sovereign power to meet a 
national exigency. Suppose the Constitution had failed to con-
fer on Congress the power to raise an army when the country is 
invaded by another nation, Ames hypothesized.88 Who could 
deny that the national government would have the power to 
raise an army to defend the nation from such an attack?89 From 
the instant a government is formed, Ames argued, “it has tacit-
ly annexed to its being, various powers which the individuals 
who framed it did not separately possess, but which are essen-
tial to its effecting the purposes for which it was framed.”90 
Presaging Marshall’s McCulloch opinion, Ames admonished, 
“to declare, in detail, every thing that Government may do 
could not be performed, and has never been attempted. It 
would be endless, useless, and dangerous; exceptions of what it 
may not do are shorter and safer.”91 
Representative Boudinot also rejected Madison’s constitu-
tional construction. He made an argument that anticipated 
Chief Justice Marshall’s national sovereignty theory of Con-
gress’s inherent penal powers, which constitutes the Supreme 
Court’s effective rejection of Madison’s constitutional construc-
tion. Boudinot asserted that congressional penal powers are in-
herent in Congress’s implied power to establish federal courts.92 
“Examine the law with regard to crimes and punishments un-
der the power of establishing courts, we have implied the power 
of punishing the stealing and falsifying the records, and ascer-
tained the punishment of perjury, bribery, and extortion.”93 
 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 1903, 1905–07 (statement of Rep. Ames). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1905. For Alexander Hamilton’s version of this theory of inher-
ent sovereign powers, which he referred to as “resulting” powers, see infra 
notes 201–10 and accompanying text. 
 91. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1905 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames). For Chief 
Justice Marshall’s statement, see infra notes 391–94 and accompanying text. 
Boudinot made the same point. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 92. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1919, 1925–26 (1791) (statement of Rep. 
Boudinot). 
 93. Id. at 1925. Chief Justice Marshall used this example of an inherent 
sovereign power in his opinion in McCulloch. See infra notes 401–03 and ac-
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John Vining, also of Delaware, similarly insisted that, as a 
free and independent nation, the U.S. possesses all of the sov-
ereign powers possessed by a sovereign nation. He argued that 
from “the act by which the United States became a free and in-
dependent nation . . . they derive all the powers appertaining to 
a nation thus circumstanced, and consequently the power un-
der consideration.”94 Vining traced the origins of corporations 
and concluded that, from the first corporation to the present 
day, “all civilized and independent nations have been in the 
practice of creating them.”95 Consequently, Congress may also 
create them. 
Madison replied to Vining and insisted that the theory that 
a sovereign government necessarily possesses every sovereign 
power does not apply to the United States. “However true this 
idea may be in the theory,” Madison opined, he denied “that it 
applied to the Government of the United States,” because of 
“the restrictive clause in the Constitution.”96 He could not see a 
way to avoid the limitations the Tenth Amendment imposed on 
Congress’s unenumerated powers.97 
E. DOES THE TENTH AMENDMENT EXPAND OR LIMIT 
CONGRESS’S POWERS? 
Supporters of the bank bill did not understand the Tenth 
Amendment as a preclusion of Congress’s inherent sovereign 
powers. Like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch,98 they inter-
preted the Tenth Amendment in exactly the opposite way: the 
amendment confirmed the doctrine that Congress may exercise 
any power necessary to accomplish an end or object for which 
the Constitution was established so long as the power is not 
expressly prohibited or explicitly reserved to the states or to the 
people. Thus, Representative Ames asserted that “Congress 
may do whatever is necessary to the end for which the Consti-
tution was adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural 
rights of man, or to those which they have expressly reserved to 
 
companying text. 
 94. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1791) (statement of Rep. Vining). 
 95. Id. at 1957. 
 96. Id. (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 97. See id. 
 98. For Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion, see infra notes 385–88 and 
accompanying text. 
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themselves, or to the powers which are assigned to the 
States.”99 
Bank supporters objected that restricting Congress’s im-
plied powers to those that are indispensable to carrying into 
execution its enumerated powers, as the bank’s opponents ar-
gued, would render unconstitutional most of the statutes Con-
gress had enacted over the preceding two years, “for few, if any 
of them, could be proved indispensable to the existence of the 
Government.”100 Representative Gerry complained that, under 
Madison’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, “our whole 
code of laws is unconstitutional.”101 “The usage of Congress” 
demonstrates that federal legislation was “generally the result 
of a liberal construction” of the Constitution.102 Representative 
Gerry cited legislation that conferred on the President the ex-
clusive power to remove executive officers and suggested that 
Madison was inconsistent in his constitutional construction be-
cause he had supported the executive removal statute Congress 
enacted in 1789.103 The Constitution is silent on this matter, 
Gerry noted, and, according to Madison’s constitutional inter-
pretation, the power to remove executive officers “is vested in 
the States and the people.”104 Nevertheless, when the bill that 
delegated to the President the power to remove executive offic-
ers was before Congress in 1789, Madison had argued that this 
unenumerated sovereign power should be vested in the Presi-
dent alone because it is implied from the nature of executive 
powers to remove executive officials.105 
F. THE POWER TO REMOVE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS IS INHERENT 
IN THE NATURE OF THE EXECUTIVE 
During the 1789 legislative debates over who has the pow-
er to remove executive officers, Madison made the most elabo-
rate argument that it should rest exclusively in the President 
because the removal power is inherent in the nature of execu-
 
 99. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1906 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames). Repre-
sentative Lawrence made the same point. See id. at 1914–19 (statement of 
Rep. Lawrence). For Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion, see infra notes 388–
89, 391–97, and accompanying text. 
 100. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1911 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
 101. Id. at 1951 (statement of Rep. Gerry). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. 
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tive powers.106 Madison declared: “I conceive that if any power 
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of ap-
pointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the 
laws. If the Constitution had not qualified the power of the 
President in appointing to office, by associating the Senate with 
him him [sic] in that business,” Congress would have been 
powerless “to unite the Senate with the President in the ap-
pointment to office,” and the President would have had the ex-
clusive authority to make these appointments.107 Since the Con-
stitution is silent with respect to the removal power, which, 
Madison asserted, is “as much of an Executive nature as the 
other,” Congress does not “have a right to associate [the Senate 
with the President] in removing persons from office.”108 The ap-
pointment power “only is authorized by being excepted out of 
the general rule established by the Constitution, in these 
words, ‘the Executive power shall be vested in the President.’”109 
Not only did Madison infer exclusive removal power in the 
President from the nature of executive powers in 1789, he also 
led a group of representatives who argued that Congress is the 
institution that resolves questions of constitutional construc-
tion and interpretation when the answers are unclear, and its 
interpretation has precedential authority. Thus, Madison in-
sisted that where the Constitution is silent in apportioning 
powers, the apportionment “becomes a subject of legislative 
discretion,” a constitutional construction consistent with the 
McCulloch court’s conclusion that Congress is the institution 
 
 106. For recent and conflicting accounts of these debates, compare Curtis 
A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 656–64 (2004), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 
231, 300–02 (2001). For additional analyses of these debates, see 1 CORWIN ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 317–71 (Richard Loss ed., 1981); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 36–41 
(1997); JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION 1789, at 155–89 
(1948); CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-
1796, at 140–65 (1922). 
 107. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of 
Rep. Madison). For other representatives making the same argument, see id. 
at 460 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick); id. at 469–70, 583 (statement of Rep. 
Boudinot); id. at 474 (statement of Rep. Ames); id. at 483 (statement of Rep. 
Lawrence); id. at 489 (statement of Rep. Clymer); id. at 511–12 (statement of 
Rep. Vining); id. at 561 (statement of Rep. Sylvester). 
 108. Id. at 463 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 109. Id. 
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that is to adapt the Constitution to changing circumstances.110 
Madison stated,  
If the construction of the Constitution . . . relates to a doubtful part of 
the Constitution, I suppose an exposition of the Constitution may 
come with as much propriety from the Legislature, as any other de-
partment of the Government. If the power naturally belongs to the 
Government, and the Constitution is undecided as to the body which 
is to exercise it, it is likely that it is submitted to the discretion of the 
Legislature, and the question will depend upon its own merits.111 
Madison later commented that the House’s resolution of 
this issue “demand[ed] a careful investigation and full discus-
sion,” because its constitutional construction would become a 
part of the Constitution.112 Madison stated, “our decision will 
involve the decision of all similar cases. The decision that is at 
this time made, will become the permanent exposition of the 
Constitution; and on a permanent exposition of the Constitu-
tion will depend the genius and character of the whole Gov-
ernment.”113 Madison thus assumed that Congress’s interpreta-
tion of the Constitution carried the authority of precedent.114 
G. FIRST BANK OPPONENTS REJECT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ASSERT STRICT CONSTRUCTION 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Given the positions they asserted in the executive removal 
debates of 1789, Gerry’s conclusion that bank opponents were 
inconsistent in their constitutional constructions in the 1791 
bank debates was a reasonable critique of the opposition’s ar-
guments generally. Bank opponents rejected bank proponents’ 
theory of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers and insisted 
 
 110. Id. at 462. For other representatives making the same argument, see 
id. at 475 (statement of Rep. Ames); id. at 481 (statement of Rep. Hartley); id. 
at 484–85 (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 584–85 (statement of Rep. 
Tucker). For the Supreme Court’s conclusion, see infra notes 385–99, 405–12, 
425–31, 448–52, 473–74, and accompanying text. 
 111. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 461 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of 
Rep. Madison) (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 495. 
 113. Id. During these congressional debates, Madison confided to Samuel 
Johnston that “the exposition of the Constitution is frequently a Copious 
Source [of difficulty], and must continue so untill [sic] its meaning on all great 
points shall have been settled by precedents.” Letter from James Madison to 
Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 409 
n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). 
 114. For a discussion of precedent as constitutional authority for legisla-
tion, see infra notes 145–60 and accompanying text. 
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that the Constitution limited Congress to the powers enumer-
ated in Article I. 
For example, Representative Stone objected that the na-
tional sovereignty theory is “hostile to the main principle of our 
Government,” arguing that if members of Congress “are al-
lowed to range in their sober discretion for the means [to ac-
complish its ends], it is plain they have no limits.”115 He re-
minded the House that “[i]t has been shown that the ends of 
[our] Government will include every thing.”116 The bank propo-
nents’ doctrine “turn[s the Constitution] upside down, and in-
stead of being a grant of particular powers, guarded by an im-
plied negative to all others, it is made to imply all powers.”117 
Stone claimed that the framers “forgot to guard it by express 
negative provisions,”118 a claim that is contradicted on the face 
of the Constitution.119 Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall had used 
the express prohibitions of Congress’s powers to argue in 
McCulloch that the Constitution thereby delegated to Congress 
unenumerated sovereign powers that are not explicitly prohib-
ited; otherwise, why include explicit prohibitions on substan-
tive powers not expressly granted.120 
H. CONGRESS IS AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE ITS SOVEREIGN 
POWERS 
An important part of bank proponents’ constitutional ar-
guments supporting Congress’s inherent sovereign powers was 
their insistence that Congress is empowered to interpret the 
nature and scope of its constitutional powers. This is a consti-
tutional construction Madison embraced in 1789 and aban-
doned in 1791. National sovereignty advocates based this doc-
trine on the nature of a written Constitution as necessarily 
incomplete and indefinite in the number and scope of Con-
gress’s legislative powers, on the constitutional duty imposed 
on Congress to achieve national objectives and to meet national 
exigencies, and on the discretionary nature of Congress’s legis-
lative powers in fulfilling its constitutional duties. They main-
 
 115. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983 (1791) (statement of Rep. Stone). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1983–84. 
 118. Id. at 1984. 
 119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (listing many prohibitions on Congress’s 
legislative powers). 
 120. For the prohibitions, see id. For Chief Justice Marshall’s statement, 
see infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text. 
  
724 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:699 
 
tained that doubtful questions of constitutionality and of con-
stitutional interpretation must therefore be left to the discre-
tion of Congress. 
Thus, Fisher Ames asserted that “it is rather late in the 
day to adopt it as a principle of conduct” that Congress may not 
determine and exercise implied powers, because two years of 
work would be lost.121 Ames observed that, for the better part of 
two years, “we have scarcely made a law in which we have not 
exercised our discretion with regard to the true intent of the 
Constitution.”122 He noted that the First Congress had “adopted 
it as a safe rule of action to legislate beyond the letter of the 
Constitution.”123 The reason, he explained, is that “the ingenui-
ty of man was unequal to providing, especially beforehand, for 
all the contingencies that would happen.”124 Ames insisted that 
Congress must exercise its judgment as to the meaning of the 
Constitution.125 
Representative Boudinot made a similar argument based 
on Congress’s legislative function and responsibilities, assert-
ing that the means of achieving the general purposes and ends 
of the government, such as providing for the general defense 
and the general welfare of the nation, must be left to Congress, 
as “it was their duty to fix on the best mode of effecting the 
purposes of their appointment . . . provided they do not adopt 
means expressly forbidden.”126 Consequently, whether a bank is 
“a mere conveniency for the purpose of fiscal transactions, but 
not necessary to attain the ends proposed in the Constitution 
. . . at best is mere matter of opinion, and must [therefore] be 
left to the discretion of the Legislature to determine.”127 
Representative William Smith of South Carolina invoked 
James Madison’s earlier views in support of Congress’s power 
to construe the Constitution.128 Smith cited to Madison’s state-
ments in the 1789 congressional debates over the President’s 
power to remove executive officials.129 In this debate Madison 
declared that the Congress had “as good a right as any branch 
 
 121. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.; see also id. at 1960 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
 125. Id. at 1954 (statement of Rep. Ames). 
 126. Id. at 1973 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 1977; see also id. at 1990 (statement of Rep. Giles). 
 128. Id. at 1980 (statement of Rep. Smith of S.C.). 
 129. Id. 
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of the Government to declare our sense of the meaning of the 
Constitution. Nothing has yet been offered to invalidate the 
doctrine, that the meaning of the Constitution may as well be 
ascertained by the legislative as by the judicial authority.”130 
Smith insisted that Madison’s view of Congress’s discretionary 
authority to interpret its constitutional powers applied to the 
bank bill.131 
Bank supporters also based Congress’s authority to inter-
pret its constitutional powers on a republican theory of popular 
sovereignty, which recognized “the people themselves”132 as the 
ultimate authority in deciding questions of constitutional in-
terpretation. Congress legislates to achieve its great objects at 
its peril, Representative Gerry argued, for the members of both 
Houses of Congress “are responsible to their constituents for 
their conduct in construing the Constitution.”133 
However, four members of Congress commented that the 
judiciary possessed the power to set aside an unconstitutional 
act of Congress. Only one bank opponent made this claim, Rep-
resentative William Giles of Virginia.134 Three of the bill’s sup-
porters conceded the power of the courts to check Congress 
should it unconstitutionally usurp legislative power.135 
It is not clear that these legislators were expressing a theo-
ry of judicial review as we understand it today, as a judicial 
power to void a statute and extinguish it as a law as distin-
guished from declaring a statute null and void and consequent-
ly refuse to enforce it. Representative Boudinot clearly ex-
pressed this latter understanding. He responded to legislators 
who opposed the bank bill because it might be adjudged by the 
judiciary as “contrary to the Constitution, and therefore void; 
and not lend their aid to carry it into execution.”136 In any case, 
Boudinot retorted that this claim strengthened his resolve to 
 
 130. Id. at 546–47 (1789) (statement of Rep. Madison). For a fuller discus-
sion of Madison’s theory of congressional supremacy in interpreting the Con-
stitution, see supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 
 131. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980, 1988 (1791) (statement of Rep. Smith of 
S.C.). 
 132. The idea of “the people themselves” as the ultimate authority on ques-
tions of constitutionality is taken from LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEM-
SELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 133. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2003 (1791) (statement of Rep. Gerry). 
 134. Id. at 1996 (statement of Rep. Giles). 
 135. Id. at 1966 (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 1988 (statement of 
Rep. Smith of S.C.); id. at 1978 (statement of Rep. Boudinot). 
 136. Id. at 1978 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (emphasis added). 
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vote for the bill and “all subjects of a constitutional nature,” be-
cause, “he reflected that if . . . he should do wrong, that there 
was a power in the Government which could constitutionally 
prevent the operation of such a wrong measure from effecting 
his constituents.”137 Boudinot gloated that “it was the glory of 
the Constitution that there was a remedy even for the failures 
of the supreme Legislature itself.”138 
Reflecting his departmentalist view of constitutional inter-
pretation, Madison rejected the claim of those who maintained 
that the judiciary “will rectify our mistakes.”139 He did not see 
how a judge might decide such a question other than “by rules 
of expediency.”140 The position Madison asserted on this issue in 
the House debates was consistent with the view he expressed in 
his Federalist No. 44, where he identified political process as 
the ultimate check on Congress’s usurpation of power.141 There 
he observed that the success of a congressional usurpation of 
power depended upon the executive and judicial departments, 
“which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts.”142 
However, “in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from 
the people, who can, by the election of more faithful representa-
tives, annul the acts of the usurpers.”143 Although Madison’s 
views on this point were consistent, on other important points 
Madison moved 180 degrees away from the principles he af-
firmed in Federalist No. 44. Moreover, he took the opposite 
view and supported Congress’s power to charter the national 
bank as President in 1816.144 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT AS AUTHORITY FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
It was a logical progression to reason from Congress’s au-
thority to define its constitutional powers to the doctrine that 
Congress’s prior actions may serve as precedent for its subse-
 
 137. Id. (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. at 1979. 
 139. Id. at 2010 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 140. Id. 
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 285–86 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 142. Id. at 286. 
 143. Id. This is one of the main claims of KRAMER, supra note 132, at 8. 
 144. See infra notes 225–29 and accompanying text (describing this sup-
port). 
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quent actions.145 Opposition leader Representative Giles 
acknowledged that the bank’s proponents argued that a source 
of Congress’s implied power to charter a bank was the “former 
usages and habits of Congress.”146 He distinguished the exam-
ples supporters referred to and declared that unconstitutional 
acts of the past should be stopped and not be used to support 
unconstitutional acts in the present.147 
The doctrine of constitutional precedent was an important 
theory of determining governmental power and individual 
rights in eighteenth century Anglo-American law.148 Many of 
the colonists’ legal/constitutional arguments for and against the 
acts of Parliament and colonial rights that led to the American 
Revolution were based on historical precedent.149 William E. 
Nelson relates other aspects of colonial constitutional norms 
and practices that political leaders carried into the new nation 
in the forthcoming volume four of The Common Law of Colonial 
America.150 
Arguments from precedent were made for and against 
Congress’s power to charter the First Bank. The bill’s support-
ers based their argument that Congress had legislative author-
ity to enact the bank bill in part on the precedent of the Bank of 
North America enacted by the Continental Congress in 1781. 
Representative Lawrence asserted that the Bank of North 
 
 145. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1975–76 (1791) (statement of Rep. Boudinot); 
id. at 1981 (statement of Rep. Smith of S.C.); id. at 2008 (statement of Rep. 
Vining) (supporting the authority of Congress to define its constitutional pow-
ers); supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text. 
 146. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1995 (1791) (statement of Rep. Giles). 
 147. Id. 
 148. For the most thorough examination of the doctrine and authority of 
precedents and how they were used in the pre-Revolutionary struggle between 
the American colonies and Parliament, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986–1993). For an abridged 
edition of these four volumes, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (abridged ed. 1995). The importance of 
precedent, especially legislative precedent as constitutional authority for sub-
sequent legislation and public policy, is explained in JOHN PHILLIP REID, CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO 
LEGISLATE, 166–71, 198–200, 211–21, 246–72 (1991). 
 149. E.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 122–34 (1987) (describing 
the use of the theory of precedent in arguing for and against Parliamentary 
taxes). 
 150. William E. Nelson, The Common Law of Colonial America, Volume 
Four: On the Eve of Revolution, 1735-1776, at 370–88 (Oct. 17, 2016) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author). 
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America was precedential authority from an inherent national 
sovereignty theory.151 Lawrence argued that “the old Congress 
exercised the power, as they thought, by a fair construction of 
the Confederation.”152 He insisted that no one would disagree 
that the present government was vested with powers equal to 
the late Confederation.153 
Interestingly, Madison conceded bank proponents’ argu-
ment that precedent established Congress’s authority to char-
ter the First Bank, but he insisted that the Bank of North 
America was distinguishable and therefore not precedential au-
thority for the First Bank bill.154 Madison maintained that 
“[t]his [Bank of North America] was known . . . to have been 
the child of necessity. It never could be justified by the regular 
powers of the articles of Confederation.”155 He explained that 
the national government’s financial needs in 1791 could be 
supplied by state banks, which did not exist in 1781.156 His posi-
tion appears to endorse bank proponents’ constitutional doc-
trine of inherent sovereign powers to meet national exigencies. 
Representative Boudinot countered that state banks, pri-
vate investors, and foreign sources of credit were insufficient to 
meet the nation’s government constitutional obligations in 1791 
and also argued the national sovereignty theory in support of 
the First Bank bill.157 The Constitution delegates to Congress 
the duty to provide for the general defense, especially during 
war, and the general welfare of the nation.158 Consequently, 
Congress must possess the power “to secure institutions at 
home from which loans may be obtained at all times at moder-
ate terms and in such amounts as the necessity of the State 
 
 151. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1965 (1791) (statement of Rep. Lawrence). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1941. For other proponents who cited the Bank of North Ameri-
ca as a precedential authority, see id. at 1975 (statement of Rep. Boudinot); id. 
at 2005 (statement of Rep. Gerry). 
 154. Madison had asserted the principle of congressional precedent as an 
authoritative constitutional construction in the debates relating to the execu-
tive removal power. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text. 
 155. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 156. Id. The same argument is made in id. at 2011 (asking whether “prece-
dents in war [are] to justify violations of private and State rights in a time of 
peace”); id. at 1984 (statement of Rep. Stone); id. at 1995 (statement of Rep. 
Giles) (denying that the Bank of North America was a precedent for the First 
Bank because the necessity for the bank in 1781 did not exist in 1791). 
 157. Id. at 1973–75 (statement of Rep. Boudinot). 
 158. See id. at 174 (describing reliance on foreign loans as contrary to this 
provision). 
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might require.”159 Boudinot asserted that a national bank is a 
“necessary means, without which the end could not be ob-
tained.”160 
J. POWERS IMPLIED FROM ENUMERATED POWERS 
In addition to the broad theories of Congress’s inherent 
sovereign legislative powers, the bank bill’s proponents also 
broadly construed Congress’s powers implied from those enu-
merated in Article I. They argued that Congress’s power to 
charter a national bank is implied in several of the enumerated 
powers, such as the power to levy and collect taxes, to borrow 
money, to pay the debts of the U.S., to regulate commerce, and 
to provide for the general defense and welfare of the U.S.161 
Interpretations of powers implied from enumerated powers 
were made in connection with interpretations of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.162 These interpretations, both broad and 
narrow, are well known. Opponents of the bank bill insisted 
that Congress may exercise only those implied powers that are 
indispensably necessary to carry into execution the enumerated 
powers to which they are incidents.163 Thus, Representative 
Giles interpreted “necessary” in the same way Maryland’s 
counsel interpreted it in McCulloch v. Maryland,164 as a power 
without which “the end could not be produced.”165 Madison more 
broadly defined the Necessary and Proper Clause “according to 
the natural and obvious force of the terms and the context” as 
“limited to means necessary to the end, and incident to the na-
ture of the specified powers.”166 
It is important to note that Madison acknowledged that 
Congress possesses implied powers even without the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.167 He asserted that “[t]he [Necessary and 
Proper] [C]lause is merely declaratory of what would have re-
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text (describing how this 
power was argued to be implied). 
 162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 163. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1967 (1791) (statement of Rep. Jackson); id. at 
1985–87 (statement of Rep. Stone); id. at 1990–95 (statement of Rep. Giles). 
 164. See infra notes 426, 433, 458–63, and accompanying text, especially 
notes 462–63, for further analysis of this case. 
 165. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1993 (1791) (statement of Rep. Giles). 
 166. Id. at 1947 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 167. Id. 
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sulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and, as 
it were, the technical means of executing those powers.”168 Mad-
ison appears to have been paraphrasing his Federalist No. 44.169 
Madison thus asserted a broader theory of implied powers than 
congressional supporters of strict construction constitutional-
ism, but narrower than congressional advocates of national 
sovereignty constitutionalism. Nevertheless, Madison and the 
other opponents of the bank bill insisted that the power to 
charter a bank was not incidental to any of Congress’s enumer-
ated powers.170 
K. CONGRESS’S INHERENT POWERS TO PROVIDE FOR THE 
NATION’S GENERAL WELFARE 
Even though some bank proponents claimed that Congress 
could charter the proposed bank as a power implied from enu-
merated powers, they continued to employ an inherent sover-
eign powers theory based on the power to provide for the gen-
eral welfare and other ends stated in the Preamble, Article I, 
and throughout the Constitution.171 Congress may therefore ex-
ercise any power that is necessary to achieve the purposes and 
ends for which it was established. Consequently, its powers 
“are so numerous,” and “capable of such infinite variation, as to 
render an enumeration impracticable, and must therefore be 
left to construction and necessary implication.”172 Thus, many 
supporters of the bank bill confirmed Madison’s view that sup-
porters’ interpretation of Congress’s legislative powers, in pur-
suing the general welfare, “will reach every object of legislation, 
every object within the whole compass of political economy.”173 
Representative Gerry applied William Blackstone’s last 
rule of interpretation of legal texts in support of Congress’s in-
herent sovereign powers: “when the words are dubious,” to as-
certain “the true meaning of a law,” one should look to “the rea-
son and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the 
Legislature.”174 Essentially paraphrasing the Constitution’s 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Madison, supra note 141, at 285. 
 170. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison) 
(stating that the bank would be only convenient, not necessary). 
 171. See infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text (outlining this theory). 
 172. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1962 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick); see also 
supra, notes 61–65 and accompanying text (describing this theory). 
 173. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 174. Id. at 2002 (statement of Rep. Gerry). 
  
2016] INHERENT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 731 
 
Preamble, Gerry broadly defined the causes that moved the 
people to adopt the Constitution: “[A]n imperfect Union, want 
of public and private justice, internal commotions, a defenceless 
[sic] community, neglect of the public welfare, and danger to 
our liberties.”175 If these causes produced the Constitution, they 
not only empower Congress to remove them, but they also re-
quire Congress to make all laws that are necessary and proper 
for carrying these ends into effect.176 
The House debates leading to the creation of the First 
Bank demonstrate that the primary constitutional theory sup-
porters of the bank bill asserted was inherent national sover-
eignty constitutionalism that encompassed a doctrine of Con-
gress’s inherent sovereign powers that were limited to 
accomplishing the ends and objects stated in the Preamble and 
the other clauses in the Constitution. In anachronistic twenty-
first-century terms, supporters were asserting a kind of federal 
police power defined by and limited to the ends and objects es-
tablished in the Constitution. 
Opponents essentially acknowledged this theory.177 James 
Madison noted that the bank’s supporters failed to distinguish 
between powers “inferred from the general nature of Govern-
ment” and powers that are “necessary and proper for executing 
the enumerated powers.”178 He complained that supporters 
maintained that Congress may exercise sovereign powers that 
are not enumerated, ignoring the “peculiar nature of the [na-
tional] Government” in which “the powers composing the Gov-
ernment were expressly enumerated.”179 Consequently, alt-
hough the supporters’ theory of general powers applied to other 
nation-states, Madison reasoned, it did not apply to the U.S. 
government, and sovereign powers of government that are not 
enumerated in the Constitution “could not be inferred from the 
general nature of [the national] Government.”180 Madison’s ar-
gument here is 180 degrees opposite to his analysis of Con-
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text for Madison’s views on 
the issue. 
 178. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1900; see also id. at 1957 (arguing that the Constitution limits 
the powers of government to those expressly written). 
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gress’s legislative powers in Federalist No. 44 and as Presi-
dent.181 
It was with good reason that the bank’s opponents warned 
that, if it were conceded that Congress may charter the pro-
posed bank, it could charter manufacturing companies, canal 
companies, and even religious societies and employ religious 
teachers in every parish and pay them from the U.S. Treas-
ury.182 If supporters’ national sovereignty and inherent congres-
sional powers constitutionalism were adopted, Congress would 
soon possess “all possible powers” of government, reducing the 
Constitution to “nothing but a name.”183 
The House nevertheless passed the bank bill on February 
8, 1791, by a vote of thirty-nine yea to twenty nay.184 Bray 
Hammond has reported that thirty-three out of the thirty-nine 
votes in favor of the bill came from representatives from New 
England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.185 Most of 
the votes against the bill, fifteen of twenty, were cast by repre-
sentatives from Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia.186 The 
vote confirms the views of historians and members of the First 
Congress who claimed that legislators’ views regarding the con-
stitutionality of the First Bank were affected, and possibly de-
termined, by their economic, financial, and geographical inter-
ests.187 
The bill was sent to President George Washington for his 
signature.188 However, the President referred the bill to his at-
torney general, Edmund Randolph, his secretary of state, 
Thomas Jefferson, and his secretary of the treasury, Alexander 
Hamilton, for their views regarding the bill’s constitutionali-
ty.189 Jefferson’s and Hamilton’s reports on the bill’s constitu-
tionality have achieved canonical status on the theories of im-
plied powers. 
 
 181. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text; infra notes 451–53, 
477–80, and accompanying text (discussing Madison’s opposing position that 
the powers of government are not limited to those expressly enumerated). 
 182. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 183. Id. at 1917 (statement of Rep. Jackson). 
 184. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 116–17. 
 185. Id. at 117. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text. 
 188. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 117. 
 189. Id. 
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II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE IN PRESIDENT 
WASHINGTON’S CABINET   
A. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S 
OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BANK 
Secretary of State Jefferson and Attorney General Ran-
dolph echoed the strict construction constitutionalism asserted 
by congressional opponents of the First Bank. It is well known, 
and I have already explained the theory.190 Alexander Hamil-
ton’s opinion has not been fully understood and requires some 
elaboration. 
Hamilton wrote his report after he had examined those of 
Jefferson and Randolph. Hamilton’s report was far more com-
prehensive and detailed than the other two combined. His 
analysis embraced the national sovereignty constitutionalism 
argued by the House bank proponents, and it followed a struc-
ture of analysis and asserted constitutional constructions that 
Chief Justice Marshall later adopted in his McCulloch opin-
ion.191 That is, Hamilton first presented arguments and inter-
pretations based on general reasoning and general principles of 
government.192 He then offered his interpretation of enumerat-
ed and implied powers.193 
Hamilton’s opinion was a rebuttal to Jefferson’s and Ran-
dolph’s arguments against the constitutionality of the bank bill 
because the power of incorporation is a sovereign power that 
the Constitution does not explicitly delegate to Congress.194 
Hamilton’s reply was based on his understanding that the na-
tional government possesses the sovereign powers inherent in 
all sovereign governments.195 He articulated national sovereign-
ty constitutionalism when he proclaimed: 
[T]his general principle is inherent in the very definition of Govern-
ment and essential to every step of the progress . . . of the United 
States; namely—that every power vested in a Government is in its 
 
 190. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining strict construc-
tion constitutionalism). 
 191. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 117–18; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 192. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitution-
ality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEX-
ANDER HAMILTON, Feb. 1791–July 1791, 97, 98 (Harold Syrett ed., 1965). 
 193. Id. at 100. 
 194. Id. at 112. 
 195. Id. at 98. 
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nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ 
all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the 
ends of such power . . . .196 
There are only two limitations on the national govern-
ment’s exercise of these inherent powers, Hamilton argued: the 
first limitation consists of any restriction or prohibition that is 
explicitly stated in the Constitution or would violate a principle 
of morality or good government; the second limitation is that 
the United States exercise its powers to achieve an end or ends 
that the Constitution vests in it.197 
Satisfied that general political theories establish that gov-
ernments, including the U.S. government, possess inherent 
sovereign powers, Hamilton concluded that “[t]his general & 
indisputable principle puts at once an end to the abstract ques-
tion—Whether the United States have power to erect a corpora-
tion . . . .”198 He explained that “it is unquestionably incident to 
sovereign power to erect corporations, and consequently to that 
of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the 
management of the government.”199 Hamilton thus recognized a 
distinction between a government whose authority “is general,” 
which can therefore “create corporations in all cases” and a 
government, such as the U.S. government, whose authority is 
confined to certain objects and ends.200 The U.S. government 
may exercise the sovereign powers that inhere in governments 
generally, but “only in those cases” related to its objects and 
ends.201 
Hamilton identified three classes of national governmental 
powers. It is undeniable, he asserted, “that there are implied, 
as well as express powers, and that the former are as effectually 
delegated as the latter.”202 However, there is a third class of 
powers, Hamilton opined, which he labeled “resulting pow-
ers.”203 These are powers that “result from the whole mass of 
the powers of the government & from the nature of political so-
 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 99–100.  
 198. Id. at 99. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 100. 
 203. Id. Representatives Madison, Ames, Boudinot and Vining debated 
whether the national government may exercise substantive sovereign powers 
that are not expressly delegated. See supra notes 79–97 and accompanying 
text. 
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ciety, than a consequence of either of the powers specially enu-
merated.”204 
Hamilton illustrated resulting powers with the example of 
the United States asserting dominion over territory it might 
have conquered from another country. The national govern-
ment “would possess sovereign jurisdiction over the conquered 
territory” even though this sovereign power is neither express 
nor implied.205 Hamilton asserted that this example “furnishes 
a striking illustration of the general doctrine contended for.”206 
Congress’s “power of erecting corporations is either implied in, 
or would result from some or all of the powers, vested in the 
National Government.”207 “The only question,” then, is “whether 
the mean to be employed,” that is, whether the unenumerated 
power, “has a natural relation to any of the acknowledged ob-
jects or lawful ends of the government.”208 For Hamilton, this 
was an empirical question of fact and not a semantic question 
of textual meaning as strict constructionists argued. Hamilton 
illustrated this point by noting that Congress did not have the 
power to charter a corporation “for superintending the police of 
the city of Philadelphia,” the city in which Congress met in 
1791, “because they are not authorised to regulate the police of 
that city.”209 But Congress may charter a corporation to achieve 
national ends “because it is the province of the federal [sic] gov-
ernment to regulate those objects & because it is incident to a 
general sovereign or legislative power to regulate a thing, to 
employ all the means which relate to its regulation to the best 
& greatest advantage.”210 
Hamilton asserted another maxim of government, the 
“sound maxim of construction namely, that the powers con-
tained in a constitution of government . . . ought to be con-
strued liberally, in advancement of the public good.”211 Hamil-
ton explained that “[t]he means by which national exigencies 
are to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, na-
 
 204. Id. Justice Joseph Story also affirmed the doctrine of resulting powers 
in his treatise on the Constitution. See infra notes 512, 514–16, and accompa-
nying text. 
 205. Hamilton, supra note 192, at 100. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 100–01. 
 211. Id. at 105. 
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tional prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent 
and complexity, that there must, of necessity, be great latitude 
of discretion in the selection & application of those means . . . 
[based] on principles of liberal construction.”212 
The only restriction limiting Congress’s powers, such as its 
powers to tax and spend for the general welfare, “which does 
not apply to other governments,” is that Congress “cannot 
rightfully apply the money they raise to any purpose merely or 
purely local.”213 With this exception, Hamilton maintained, 
Congress has “as large a discretion in relation to the applica-
tion of money as any legislature whatever. The constitutional 
test of a right application must always be whether it be for a 
purpose of general or local nature. If the former, there can be 
no want of constitutional power.”214 Furthermore, the extent to 
which Congress’s action really promotes the nation’s welfare 
“must be a matter of [Congress’s] conscientious discretion.”215 
Arguments relating to Congress’s discretion whether to use its 
legislative power to promote the general welfare “must be ar-
guments concerning expediency or inexpediency, not constitu-
tional right.”216 
B. THE FIRST BANK AND BANKING, 1791–1811 
Secretary Hamilton’s arguments persuaded President 
Washington that the bank bill was constitutional. The Presi-
dent signed the bank bill into law on February 25, 1791, two 
days after he received Hamilton’s report.217 The government of 
the U.S. acquired $2 million of the initial $10 million stock is-
sue.218 Other investors included one-third of the members of 
Congress and at least one-half of the members who had voted 
for the bank bill.219 Merchants, professional men, speculators, 
other politicians, the Boston-based Massachusetts Bank, Har-
vard College, and the state of New York also invested in shares 
of First Bank stock.220 Located in Philadelphia, the First Bank 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 129. 
 214. Id. 
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 217. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 118. 
 218. Id. at 123. 
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opened branches in eight other cities from 1792 to 1805.221 
Three of these branches were opened during Thomas Jeffer-
son’s presidency with his approval, albeit unhappily.222 
Apart from constitutional scruples, the First Bank’s incor-
poration was a defining issue in the development of political 
parties. The First Bank was a Federalist Party institution op-
posed by southern anti-Federalists.223 The bank, along with 
other Federalist Party policies led to the creation of the first 
party of opposition, the Jeffersonian or Democratic Republican 
Party. The bank was run by Federalists, who were perceived to 
have operated it as an instrument of partisan politics and pat-
ronage.224 This perception, the fact that a majority of its stock 
was owned by British and European investors, and “the ex-
treme jealousy of the State banks” made it “an object of general 
odium.”225 These political, economic, and financial interests 
played important roles in legislators’ determinations whether 
the First Bank was constitutional and whether Congress 
should extend the First Bank’s charter in 1811. 
III.  CONGRESS DEBATES RECHARTER OF THE FIRST 
BANK IN 1811   
A. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND OF 
THE SECOND BANK 
The First Bank’s charter was due to expire in 1811. At the 
behest of the Senate, President Madison’s treasury secretary, 
Albert Gallatin, issued a report to Congress on March 9, 1809, 
urging Congress to renew the bank’s charter for another twenty 
years.226 Congress did not take up the measure until January 
1810, but it did not give it concentrated attention until January 
1811.227 After vigorous debate, the House decided by one vote 
(sixty-five to sixty-four) on January 24, 1811, to postpone the 
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bill indefinitely.228 This effectively defeated the extension of the 
First Bank’s charter in the House. The Senate then took up a 
bill on February 5, 1811.229 This measure was also defeated by 
one vote, eighteen to seventeen, on February 20.230 The Senate’s 
deciding vote was cast by Vice President George Clinton when 
the floor vote tied at seventeen.231 The First Bank’s charter con-
sequently expired in 1811. 
One of the findings of this study is that economic, political, 
geographic, and occupational interests as much as, if not more 
than, commitment to constitutional values and principles de-
termined the constitutional positions of political actors. The 
First Bank was a partisan institution at its creation and over 
its entire life. The political divisions in Congress for and 
against the First Bank in 1811 differed from those in 1791.232 
The original bank bill was mostly supported by northern Fed-
eralists and business interests, and the bank served their bank-
ing needs and economic interests as did the national govern-
ment through its promotion and protection of trade and 
economic development.233 Southerners were mostly agrarians 
and opposed the bank and the national government’s economic 
policies.234 
The political alignments of 1791 had changed by 1811. 
Bank supporters and opponents cut across party and geograph-
ical lines by the time its charter came up for renewal in 1811. 
James Madison, who had led the opposition in the House and 
argued against the bank’s constitutionality in 1791, as Presi-
dent in 1811 supported renewing the First Bank’s charter.235 
Many of the administration’s Democratic Republican congres-
sional allies from the North, the South, and the West also fa-
vored the charter’s renewal, though others opposed it.236 The 
bill’s floor leaders in the Senate and the House were both Dem-
ocratic Republicans.237 Federalists from the North and the 
South also split.238 
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Over the course of the First Bank’s life, the states became 
involved in promoting economic expansion and diversification, 
and they increased the number of state-chartered banks from 
three to more than seventy.239 State banks served many of the 
local financial needs of merchants and state governments for 
short-term credit as well as the long-term credit needs of me-
chanics, manufacturers, and farmers.240 According to financial 
historian Bray Hammond, many businesses increasingly fa-
vored the state governments and state banks, and many agrar-
ians turned increasingly to the national government and the 
First Bank.241 Moreover, Democratic Republicans were no long-
er overwhelmingly agrarian and yeoman farmers. They includ-
ed commercial farmers, artisans, mechanics, and entrepre-
neurs.242 Consequently, attitudes toward the First Bank, the 
national and state governments, the emerging state banks, and 
public policy became more complicated and mixed among eco-
nomic groups, sections of the country, and the political parties. 
Hammond expressed skepticism regarding the sincerity of 
some of the opposing leaders’ concern over the bank’s constitu-
tionality, naming Senator Samuel Smith of Baltimore, Mary-
land, Senator Henry Clay of Lexington, Kentucky, and Repre-
sentative Peter B. Porter of Buffalo, New York.243 This 
skepticism would apply equally to bank supporters. Legislators 
who debated the question of the First Bank’s recharter support 
Hammond’s skepticism because they asserted that constitu-
tional arguments were inspired by the economic and partisan 
interests of their constituents.244 These views suggest that, alt-
hough many political leaders may have held and asserted theo-
ries of constitutional interpretation out of a commitment to 
constitutional principles independent of other interests, for 
many who argued the First Bank recharter question, constitu-
tional interpretation was as much or more a matter of political 
argument to advance economic, political, and other interests as 
it was sincerely held belief. 
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B. THEORY OF CONGRESS’S INHERENT SOVEREIGN POWERS 
Members of Congress reasserted many of the arguments 
regarding the First Bank’s constitutionality that had been ad-
vanced by its proponents and opponents in 1791. For example, 
First Bank supporters again insisted that Congress’s legislative 
powers are sovereign powers and that Congress possesses the 
inherent sovereign power to charter a corporation to accomplish 
the objects, ends, and purposes for which the Constitution was 
adopted.245 They agreed that the power to charter a corporation 
“is an act of sovereignty.”246 Moreover, “[t]he right to create a 
corporation is a right inherent in every sovereignty,” and, since 
everyone agreed that banks are necessary to handle the finan-
cial affairs of the nation, “it appears to be established that the 
Federal Government does possess this right.”247 Bank support-
ers admonished bank opponents that “[o]ur power to perform 
these acts results from the nature of the national sovereignty 
created by this Constitution.”248 They paraphrased Alexander 
Hamilton’s constitutional construction and insisted that  
every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and 
includes by force of the term a right to employ all the means requisite, 
and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power, and 
which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the 
Constitution, or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of 
political society.249 
Supporters of the bank charter renewal also interpreted 
Congress’s enumerated powers as statements of the objects, 
purposes, and ends for which Congress possesses inherent pow-
ers of a sovereign legislature to accomplish. Thus, if “the Gov-
ernment is sovereign as to any object,” Representative Stanley 
explained, “the power to incorporate companies, as the fit and 
necessary means for the attainment of that object, must regu-
 
 245. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 659 (1811) (statement of Rep. Key); id. at 755 
(statement of Rep. Garland); id. at 308 (statement of Sen. Pickering); id. at 
219 (statement of Sen. Pope). 
 246. Id. at 798 (statement of Rep. Stanley); id. at 272–73, 280 (statement of 
Sen. Brent); id. at 297 (statement of Sen. Taylor). But see id. at 211–12 
(statement of Sen. Clay).  
 247. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 144 (1811) (statement of Sen. Crawford); see also 
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ion. See infra notes 395–98 and accompanying text. 
 248. Id. at 231 (statement of Sen. Pope); see also id. at 273, 276 (statement 
of Sen. Brent). 
 249. Id. at 663 (statement of Rep. Pickman, Jr.); see also id. at 137 (state-
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larly result from and be appurtenant to this sovereignty.”250 
Like their congressional predecessors in 1791, congressional 
bank proponents in 1811 argued that the objects and ends of 
the national government are stated in the Constitution’s Pre-
amble as well as in the delegated powers of Article I.251 
Moreover, Representative Stanley declared that Congress’s 
sovereign “power is not left to inference,” because the Constitu-
tion’s Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause 
establish Congress’s sovereignty.252 Thus, bank supporters de-
fined an enumerated power as “an authority to attain a given 
end.”253 Specifically how Congress may achieve the given end is 
within Congress’s discretion since there are many means by 
which a power may be executed and the end achieved, and the 
choice of these means is explicitly vested in Congress by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.254 More broadly, Representative 
Key maintained that “[w]e need not look to the Constitution 
always for precise terms to justify an exercise of power, because 
it is but an enumeration of first principles,”255 arguably a ver-
sion of Hamilton’s theory of resulting powers. According to this 
view, the erection of a bank is not a constitutional question but 
merely a question of discretion to achieve a public good.256 U.S. 
Senators made similar arguments when the Senate debated the 
bank’s recharter.257 
As they did in 1791, First Bank opponents acknowledged 
that bank supporters asserted an inherent sovereignty theory 
of congressional legislative power, and they rejected it and ar-
gued the strict construction theory of limited congressional 
powers.258 Notably, Senator Smith of Maryland alarmingly de-
 
 250. Id. at 798 (statement of Rep. Stanley); see also id. at 715 (statement of 
Rep. Gold); id. at 762, 769 (statement of Rep. Nicholson); id. at 781 (statement 
of Rep. Tallmadge). 
 251. Id. at 762–63 (statement of Rep. Nicholson). 
 252. Id. at 798 (statement of Rep. Stanley); see also id. at 799. 
 253. See, e.g., id. at 661 (statement of Rep. Key). 
 254. Id.; see also id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Brent). 
 255. 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 1941 (1810) (statement of Rep. Key). 
 256. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (1811) (statement of Rep. Key); see also id. 
at 672 (statement of Rep. Alston). 
 257. See, e.g., id. at 228, 231 (statement of Sen. Pope); id. at 141–42, 144 
(statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 273, 276, 284 (statement of Sen. Brent). 
 258. Id. at 631–32, 634, 636, 639–40 (statement of Rep. Porter). Others 
make essentially the same arguments. See id. at 676 (statement of Rep. 
Wright); id. at 696 (statement of Rep. Barry); id. at 720 (statement of Rep. 
Johnson); id. at 810 (statement of Rep. Rhea); id. at 180 (statement of Sen. 
Giles). 
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clared that bank supporters’ national sovereignty theory was so 
broad that the United States would no longer have a written 
guide to Congress’s powers and that it would take the United 
States back to Great Britain where the constitution was found 
in the statutes, precedents, parliamentary guide.259 
The “radical source” of the bank’s supporters’ error, oppo-
nents argued, was their assumption that the Constitution is “a 
mere general designation of the ends or objects for which the 
Federal Government was established, and leaving to Congress 
a discretion as to the means or powers by which those ends 
shall be brought about.”260 Bank opponents objected that bank 
supporters “confound the power and the object of [the power] 
together, and make the attainment of the object, and the execu-
tion of the power given to accomplish it, convertible terms. 
Whatever, they say, attains the object for which any power is 
given, is an execution of that power.”261 In other words, bank 
supporters believed “that the execution of a power and the at-
tainment of its object, are synonymous terms.”262 Their theory of 
Congress’s powers would enable Congress to adopt “any meas-
ure not expressly prohibited by the Constitution.”263 This is pre-
cisely what bank proponents argued.264 Bank opponents object-
ed that the “constitutionality [of every bill] is made to depend 
on its [fitness and] general tendency to promote the ultimate 
objects for which these different powers were given. In other 
words, it is made to depend on its expediency.”265 
C. CONGRESS’S POWER AND DUTY TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY 
Bank proponents argued that one of the national govern-
ment’s primary duties, objects or ends, and first principles is to 
promote economic development and thereby promote and se-
cure the nation’s prosperity and general welfare.266 Representa-
 
 259. Id. at 268 (statement of Sen. Smith of Md.). 
 260. Id. at 636 (statement of Rep. Porter). 
 261. Id. at 634. 
 262. Id. at 634–35. 
 263. Id. at 644; see also id. at 652–53 (statement of Rep. Desha). 
 264. Id. at 660–61 (statement of Rep. Key); see also id. at 672 (statement of 
Rep. Alston); id. at 780–81 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 771 (state-
ment of Rep. Nicholson). For Madison’s assertion of this principle in his THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 44, see infra notes 451–55 and accompanying text. 
 265. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 645 (1811) (statement of Rep. Porter). 
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tive Jonathan Fisk of New York, for example, insisted that the 
First Bank’s continuation was an “imperious necessity” to 
maintain the nation’s credit system, its agricultural, business 
and commercial development, and its economic prosperity.267 
Some argued that Congress’s powers to lay and collect taxes, to 
pay the debts of the United States and to provide for its general 
welfare, combined with Congress’s power to pass all laws that 
are necessary and proper for carrying its powers into execution 
gave Congress ample power to extend the First Bank’s charter 
“without calling in the aid of the general grant of powers as 
contained in the Constitution—from which some gentlemen 
seem to turn with such disgust . . . .”268 
Bank opponents did not disagree that government should 
actively promote economic development and prosperity. But 
they countered by maintaining that state and local banks could 
offer any needed financial services, thus rendering the First 
Bank unnecessary.269 As did their congressional predecessors, 
bank opponents also insisted that the First Bank infringed 
states’ rights and state sovereignty.270 They regarded the opera-
tion of the national bank and its agents in the states without 
 
 267. Id. at 602–03, 609 (statement of Rep. Fisk). For similar statements, 
see id. at 670, 672 (statement of Rep. Alston); id. at 756, 759 (statement of 
Rep. Garland); id. at 750 (statement of Rep. Crawford); id. at 761–62, 773–74 
(statement of Rep. Nicholson); id. at 779 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 
164–70 (statement of Sen. Lloyd); id. at 220–21, 240 (statement of Sen. Pope); 
id. at 276, 289, 291 (statement of Senator Brent); id. at 311, 314 (statement of 
Sen. Pickering); id. at 148, 150, 345 (statement of Sen. Crawford). 
 268. Id. at 756 (statement of Rep. Garland); see also id. at 781 (statement 
of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 1804 (1810) and 295 (1811) (statement of Rep. Tay-
lor); id. at 1811–12 (statement of Rep. Findley); id. at 1941 (statement of Rep. 
Key); id. at 139 (statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 275–76 (statement of Sen. 
Brent); id. at 310–11 (statement of Sen. Pickering). 
 269. See, e.g., id. at 1797–99 (statement of Rep. Love); id. at 655 (statement 
of Rep. Desha); id. at 202 (statement of Sen. Giles); id. at 245–46, 251, 258–59 
(statement of Sen. Smith of Md.). For the debate on this issue, see id. at 1797–
99 (statement of Rep. Love); id. at 1804–05, 1808–09 (statement of Rep. Taylor 
of S.C.); id. at 1811–12 (1810) and 703 (1811) (statement of Rep. Findley); id. 
at 1943 (statement of Rep. Troup); id. at 584 (statement of Rep. Burwell); id. 
at 623 (statement of Rep. Seybert); id. at 639 (statement of Rep. Porter); id. at 
683 (statement of Rep. Wright); id. at 712, 716 (statement of Rep. Gold); id. at 
750 (statement of Rep. Crawford); id. at 756 (statement of Rep. Garland); id. 
at 764–65 (statement of Rep. Nicholson); id. at 672 (statement of Rep. Alston); 
id. at 779–80 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 791, 794 (statement of Rep. 
Eppes); id. at 798–99 (statement of Rep. Stanley). 
 270. See, e.g., id. at 153, 154 (statement of Sen. Leib); id. at 201 (statement 
of Sen. Giles); id. at 213 (statement of Sen. Clay); id. at 342 (statement of Sen. 
Crawford). 
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the states’ permission as a violation of state sovereignty. Some 
argued that the First Bank interfered in local affairs, regulated 
the rights and relations of property between citizens, exercised 
the power to destroy local banks, thus creating disharmony and 
conflict, and “obliterate[ing] and destroy[ing] the distribution of 
powers between the federal and state governments.”271 Porter 
concluded that the doctrine of implied powers “compass, at a 
single sweep, all the rights of the States; and form the basis of 
a consolidated Government.”272 
D. BANK SUPPORTERS ARGUE FROM PRECEDENT AND POLITICAL 
PRACTICE 
As did their predecessors in 1791, bank supporters cited 
congressional precedent in answering opponents’ rejection of 
their doctrine of inherent national sovereignty, which oppo-
nents condemned as “unknown to the Constitution, and abhor-
rent to Republicanism, and dangerous to our liberties.”273 Bank 
supporters also argued that past political practices associated 
specifically with the Bank of the United States established the 
First Bank’s constitutionality.274 President Madison approved 
the charter’s extension “on the ground, he said later, admitting 
‘expediency and almost necessity,’ of ‘deliberate and reiterated 
precedents.’”275 
E. SUPPORTERS ARGUE NATIONAL EXIGENCIES AUTHORIZE 
CONGRESS TO CHARTER A BANK 
Supporters also insisted that Congress may legislate to 
meet national exigencies and that such exigencies rendered the 
bank constitutional. For example, Representative Thomas R. 
 
 271. Id. at 645–46 (statement of Rep. Porter); see also id. at 584–85 (state-
ment of Rep. Burwell); id. at 155 (statement of Sen. Leib); id. at 206 (state-
ment of Sen. Giles). 
 272. Id. at 646 (statement of Rep. Porter); see also id. at 684 (statement of 
Rep. Wright); id. at 697 (statement of Rep. Barry); id. at 717, 727 (statement 
of Rep. Johnson); id. at 755 (statement of Rep. Crawford); id. at 201 (state-
ment of Sen. Giles). 
 273. Id. at 799 (statement of Rep. Stanley); see, e.g., id. at 669 (statement 
of Rep. Pickman); id. at 820–21 (statement of Rep. McKee); id. at 139, 144 
(statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 276 (statement of Sen. Brent); id. at 309–
11 (statement of Sen. Pickering). 
 274. See id. at 666 (statement of Rep. Pickman); see, e.g., id. at 712 (state-
ment of Rep. Gold); id. at 145–46 (statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 230 
(statement of Sen. Pope); id. at 281 (statement of Sen. Brent). 
 275. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 210. 
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Gold of Whitestown, New York proclaimed his deep conviction 
that the national bank was necessary to the administration of 
the nation’s finances and to the exigencies of war.276 More 
broadly, Gold declared that the national government was a sov-
ereign government, and Congress may exercise those powers 
that are “necessary to the exigencies of the country.”277 Repre-
sentative John Taylor of South Carolina argued that, “as we 
have been told by the Secretary of the Treasury, the highest 
authority in the nation, on financial affairs, that a banking in-
stitution is absolutely necessary for collecting and transferring 
the revenue of the United States, I am saved the trouble of es-
tablishing the constitutionality of the Bank of the United 
States.”278 
Representative Joseph Desha of Mays Lick, Kentucky, di-
rectly rebutted this argument and rejected bank supporters’ 
idea that expediency and constitutionality are synonymous 
terms.279 In Desha’s view, this theory would render the Consti-
tution a nullity and would leave the judgment of members of 
Congress as the only restraint on congressional power.280 Sup-
porters replied that opponents erroneously confounded the 
means by which an end is attained with the end itself.281 Thus, 
if a bank is useful and necessary to achieve an end or object of 
government, such as the collection of taxes or the payment of 
the public debt, then the bank bill is constitutional.282 If a bank 
is the best mode of effectuating these powers, then Congress is 
duty bound to establish it.283 Supporters argued further that 
twenty years of experience with the Bank of the United States 
had “evinced its’ utility to the government” in achieving its ob-
jects and ends, and so the bank should be re-chartered.284 
 
 276. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 712 (1811) (statement of Rep. Gold). 
 277. Id.; see also id. at 1941 (statement of Rep. Key). 
 278. LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES, supra note 12, at 458. 
 279. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 653 (1811) (statement of Rep. Desha). 
 280. Id. at 654. 
 281. See, e.g., id. at 660 (statement of Rep. Key). 
 282. Id. at 661. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 666 (statement of Rep. Pickman). 
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F. BANK PROPONENTS ARGUE THAT CONGRESS MAY EXERCISE 
POWERS THAT ARE NOT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED OR EXPRESSLY 
RESERVED TO THE STATES OR TO THE PEOPLE 
Bank supporters asserted the principle of statutory con-
struction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius or, the expression 
of one thing is the exclusion of another, as a sound rule of con-
struction which “governs the construction of all grants and in-
stalments in public or in private life.”285 This is an alternative 
expression of the view that Congress may exercise those sover-
eign powers that are not expressly prohibited to it, or expressly 
reserved to the states or to the people. Consequently, “where a 
grant creates a general power and enumerates exceptions to its 
exercise,” Representative Philip B. Key of Maryland opined, 
“the expression and enumeration of those exceptions operate to 
exclude all others.”286 Under this view, a “power” is “an authori-
ty to attain a given end.”287 Consequently, the Constitution au-
thorizes Congress to exercise those sovereign powers that it 
does not explicitly prohibit or explicitly reserve to the states or 
to the people. This principle also derives from a broad construc-
tion of the Tenth Amendment.288 
G. BANK OPPONENTS COUNTER THAT THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
PRECLUDES IMPLIED POWERS 
Opponents of re-chartering countered that the Tenth 
Amendment, strictly interpreted, excludes implied powers. For 
example, Representative Joseph Desha of Kentucky asserted 
that the Tenth Amendment expressly prohibits the theory of 
“constructive powers” bank proponents relied on.289 Congress 
may exercise only those legislative powers the Constitution ex-
pressly delegated to it. He defied anyone to identify a clause in 
the Constitution that would justify granting monopolies or ex-
clusive privileges, such as the national bank.290 Desha rejected 
the doctrine of implied powers as absurd and dangerous, claim-
 
 285. Id. at 660 (statement of Rep. Key). 
 286. Id.; accord id. at 781 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge). See infra, notes 
451, 453, and accompanying text for Madison’s assertion of this principle in 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44. 
 287. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (1811) (statement of Rep. Key). 
 288. Id. at 780–81 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); see also id. at 771 
(statement of Rep. Nicholson); infra note 525. 
 289. Id. at 652 (statement of Rep. Desha); see also id. at 753 (statement of 
Rep. Crawford). 
 290. Id. 
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ing that he had thought the doctrine of implied powers had long 
ago been exploded when the Alien and Sedition Acts were en-
acted under this doctrine, and the people expressed their dis-
approval of the doctrine by throwing the congressional majority 
out of power.291 He objected that the doctrine of implied powers 
destroyed the barriers of the Constitution, rendering its limita-
tions on power a “dead letter.”292 Representative John Rhea of 
Tennessee asserted the opposite constitutional construction to 
that of bank proponents. Rhea argued that since the power to 
charter a bank was not enumerated in the Constitution nor 
prohibited to the states or to the people, it was reserved to the 
states and to “the people in their individual State capacities.”293 
After all of these arguments, the bill to recharter the First 
Bank failed by one vote in the House (sixty-four to sixty-five) 
and one vote in the Senate (seventeen to eighteen), with the tie-
breaking vote cast by Vice President George Clinton.294 The 
demise of the First Bank was ill-timed, because the War of 
1812 broke out shortly after it. The war demonstrated the utili-
ty of a national bank. 
IV.  THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1816   
A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SECOND 
BANK 
Events following the demise of the First Bank led to the 
creation of the Second Bank. First, the number of state-
chartered banks exploded. Second, the War of 1812 created a 
financial crisis. In the five years between 1811 and 1816, states 
chartered 175 banks, almost twice the number they had char-
tered in the twenty-year period between 1791 and 1811.295 
Freed from the restraining power of the First Bank in 1811, 
state banks “went wild” issuing paper notes, greatly exceeding 
their gold and silver reserves, depreciating the value of paper 
money, and forcing the banks to suspend specie payments in an 
1814 run on the banks by alarmed depositors, who were fright-
 
 291. Id. at 652–53. 
 292. Id. at 652. 
 293. Id. at 816 (statement of Rep. Rhea). 
 294. Id. at 346–47, 826. 
 295. WOOD, supra note 6, at 296. 
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ened by the British raid on Washington and threatened seizure 
of Baltimore.296 
The national government was also disabled by the absence 
of a national bank. The government turned to state banks to 
handle its financial business, but they proved to be “nearly use-
less.”297 Without a national bank, the national government was 
unable to transfer funds across the country or to pay the esca-
lating costs of the war. Needing $50 million to pay the govern-
ment’s debts, President Madison’s treasury secretary, George 
W. Campbell, was unable to borrow the needed funds, and in 
November 1814 the government defaulted on the national 
debt.298 With the national government bankrupt and the public 
credit in shambles, Treasury Secretary Campbell resigned.299 
His replacement, Alexander Dallas, recommended that the gov-
ernment increase internal taxes and establish a new, enlarged 
Bank of the United States to meet the country’s desperate con-
dition.300 
B. PRESIDENT JAMES MADISON’S TREASURY SECRETARY, 
ALEXANDER DALLAS, ASKS CONGRESS TO CHARTER THE SECOND 
BANK 
Secretary Dallas informed Congress that the country need-
ed a national bank to meet its financial exigencies by restoring 
a specie-based national currency and a nationally circulating 
system of sound bank notes, thus restoring the government’s 
creditworthiness and stimulating the infusion of credit into the 
private economy.301 Leading banking houses and wealthy busi-
nessmen, such as Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, and David 
Parish, instigated others to petition Congress for a new nation-
al bank.302 
Undoubtedly speaking for President Madison, Secretary 
Dallas addressed the question of the bank’s constitutionality.303 
 
 296. Id. at 692; see also HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 227–28. 
 297. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 229. The desperate condition of the na-
tion’s currency and public credit is described by Treasury Secretary Alexander 
Dallas in his Treasury Report to the House of Representatives on October 17, 
1814. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 401–03 (1814) (report of Sec. Dallas). 
 298. WOOD, supra note 6, at 692; see also HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 229–
30. 
 299. WOOD, supra note 6, at 692. 
 300. Id. 
 301. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 401–03 (1814) (report of Sec. Dallas). 
 302. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 231. 
 303. Id. at 232–34. 
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Madison had changed his view regarding the First Bank’s con-
stitutionality in 1810–11 on the bases of congressional prece-
dent and political practice.304 The experience of the War of 1812 
further convinced him that the public credit and financial 
needs of the nation’s economy required a new national bank. 
Thus, acknowledging that highly placed individuals had op-
posed the First Bank on constitutional grounds, Dallas ex-
pressed the view that changes in circumstances during and af-
ter the War of 1812 had produced changes in these opinions.305 
Recognizing the authority of congressional precedent, he as-
serted that twenty years of political practice had sanctioned the 
First Bank and established with finality the bank’s constitu-
tionality.306 He therefore demanded that discussion and disa-
greement over the national bank’s constitutionality must cease 
“and decision shall become absolute.”307 
Opposition in Congress to the national bank’s constitution-
ality collapsed. The Senate enacted a bill chartering a national 
bank on December 9, 1814, without debating the question of 
the bank’s constitutionality.308 Even Senator William H. Wells 
of Delaware, who presented the most elaborate argument 
against the bank bill in the Senate, conceded that the question 
of Congress’s constitutional power to incorporate a bank was 
“now at rest,” and he did not wish to revive it.309 The question 
at issue, he maintained, was the “true character and just extent 
of this authority.”310 The bill then went to the House of Repre-
sentatives. 
C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATES IN 1814 ON THE 
SECOND BANK’S CONSTITUTIONALITY, BUT WITH LITTLE 
DISAGREEMENT 
The House debates reflected wide support for a national 
bank and for the bank’s constitutionality,311 but a large number 
 
 304. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 189 (1815) (message from Pres. Madison). 
 305. Id. at 408 (report of Sec. Dallas). 
 306. Id. at 409. 
 307. Id. at 408. 
 308. Id. at 126. 
 309. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 258–59 (1816) (statement of Sen. Wells). 
 310. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 259 (1814). 
 311. See, e.g., id. at 428 (1814) (statement of Rep. Oakley); id. at 496 
(statement of Rep. Wright); id. (statement of Rep. Burwell); id. (statement of 
Rep. Duvall); id. at 496–97 (statement of Rep. Stanford); id. at 497, 671–72, 
676 (statements of Rep. Grosvenor); id. at 497 (statement of Rep. Wilson); id. 
at 498 (statement of Rep. McKee); id. at 561, 988, 1028 (statements of Rep. 
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of legislators opposed the proposed bank on practical, financial 
grounds.312 Federalists, for example, supported a national bank 
and Congress’s constitutional authority to charter a bank as 
they had in 1791, but they thought the proposed bank was too 
weak and ineffectual.313 Nevertheless, some legislators opposed 
a new national bank on the grounds that it was unconstitution-
al,314 but few made constitutional arguments against the bill.315 
Representative John Clopton of Virginia made an elaborate ar-
gument against Congress’s constitutional authority to charter a 
second national bank, but he simply reiterated the arguments 
asserted by bank opponents since 1791.316 
Statements made in the House as the debate drew to a 
close indicate that congressmen believed the nation’s finances 
were in desperate shape and that a national bank was an in-
dispensable curative. The House overwhelmingly passed the 
Senate bill with amendments on January 7, 1815, by a vote of 
120 yeas and 38 nays.317 
D. PRESIDENT MADISON AGREES THAT THE NATIONAL BANK IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL ON A THEORY OF POLITICAL PRACTICE 
President James Madison vetoed the bill in January 1815. 
In his veto message, President Madison conceded Congress’s 
 
Fisk); id. at 568, 572–73 (statements of Rep. Gaston); id. at 604, 1028 (state-
ments of Rep. Ingersoll); id. at 663–64, 665 (statements of Rep. Hanson); id. at 
686–88 (statement of Rep. Miller); id. at 692 (statement of Rep. Kilbourn); id. 
at 1027 (statement of Rep. Hall); id. at 1028 (statement of Rep. Alston). 
 312. See, e.g., id. at 428 (statement of Rep. Oakley); id. at 496 (statement of 
Rep. Burwell); id. (statement of Rep. Stanford); id. at 497, 665–71 (statements 
of Rep. Grosvenor); id. at 498 (statement of Rep. Post); id. at 562 (statement of 
Rep. Sharp); id. at 564, 987 (statements of Rep. Gaston); id. at 1014–23 
(statement of Rep. Webster); id. at 1028 (statement of Rep. Robertson); id. at 
1025–26 (statement of Speaker Cheves). 
 313. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 238. 
 314. See, e.g., 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 496, 497, 976–78 (statements of Rep. 
Clopton); id. at 496 (statement of Rep. Eppes); id. at 497, 585 (statements of 
Rep. Hawkins); id. at 1028 (statement of Rep. Macon); 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 
1339 (1816) (statement of Rep. Randolph); id. at 1340 (statement of Rep. Har-
din). But see id. at 1340 (statement of Rep. Wright) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court has tacitly recognized the bank’s constitutionality by recognizing it as a 
party in several cases). 
 315. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1339 (1816) (statement of Rep. Webster); see also 
id. at 259 (statement of Sen. Wells) (reiterating the argument that an express 
power to charter a national bank had been discussed and intentionally omitted 
from the Constitution). 
 316. See 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 976–85 (1814) (statement of Rep. Clopton). 
 317. Id. at 1044–45. 
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constitutional power to incorporate a bank on the authority of 
political practice. He explained that the question of the bank’s 
constitutionality was “precluded, in my judgment, by repeated 
recognitions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such 
an institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judi-
cial branches of the Government,” with which “the general will 
of the nation” expressed its concurrence.318 Madison thereby 
acknowledged the authority of political practice in resolving 
questions of constitutional construction and political process, as 
distinguished from judicial review, as a method of resolving 
questions of constitutional construction. This represented a 
180-degree shift in Madison’s position when he led the opposi-
tion to Congress’s authority to charter the First Bank in 1791. 
The reasons for the President’s veto were financial. Madi-
son stated that he did not believe the proposed bank was calcu-
lated to revive the public credit, to provide a national medium 
of circulation, to aid the Treasury by facilitating the collection 
of the revenue, or to afford the public “more durable loans.”319 
In short, the proposed bank bill did not meet the nation’s finan-
cial and economic needs. 
E. THE MADISON ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSAL FOR THE 
SECOND BANK 
On December 5, 1815, President Madison sent his annual 
message to Congress. Among the subjects he discussed were 
the needs to restore the public credit, to pay the debt incurred 
in the War of 1812, and to establish a uniform national curren-
cy.320 Madison advised Congress to create a national bank to 
achieve these goals.321 
Secretary Dallas sent a proposed bank bill with a letter ex-
plaining its details the very next day.322 The proposed bill called 
for a national bank capitalized at $35 million, with Congress 
authorized to increase its capital to $50 million. Its capital was 
to consist of three-quarters of public stock and one-quarter of 
specie. Like the First Bank, the proposed second bank was a 
governmental institution for the collection and distribution of 
 
 318. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 189 (1815) (message of Pres. Madison). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Letter from James Madison, Pres. of the United States, to Congress 
(Dec. 5, 1815) (on file with the American Presidency Project), http://www 
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 322. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 505 (1815) (letter of Sec. Dallas). 
  
752 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:699 
 
the government’s revenues and a private commercial bank to 
accommodate “the uses of commerce, agriculture, manufac-
tures, and the arts, throughout the Union.”323 The bank was al-
so “required to restore and maintain the national currency; and 
. . . the circulation of the national wealth.”324 
The Second Bank, again like the First Bank, was owned 
jointly by the national government and private investors. The 
federal government was authorized to purchase $7 million of 
the $35 million capitalization.325 Unlike the First Bank, the 
President appointed five of the twenty-five Second Bank direc-
tors, including the chairman of the board of directors.326 The na-
tional government was both an investor in the Second Bank 
and a participant in the bank’s governing structure. The board 
of directors was authorized to establish branches as they 
deemed appropriate.327 Each branch was to have a board of thir-
teen directors, and the Secretary of the Treasury, with the ap-
proval of the President, was authorized to appoint the presi-
dent of each branch.328 
In justifying the President’s power to appoint bank direc-
tors, Secretary Dallas emphasized the bank’s dual nature as a 
governmentally and privately owned and operated institution. 
He contended that “[t]he National Bank ought not to be regard-
ed simply as a commercial bank . . . created for the purposes of 
commerce and profit alone, but much more for the purposes of 
national policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the 
highest powers of the Government.”329 
F. THE REVISED SECOND BANK BILL IN CONGRESS 
The bank’s constitutionality had no prominence at all in 
the debates of 1814, 1815, or 1816, particularly if one compares 
these debates to those of 1791 and 1810–11.330 Thus, when he 
introduced the bank bill to the House on January 8, 1816, Rep-
resentative John C. Calhoun of South Carolina observed that 
the issue whether Congress possessed the constitutional au-
thority to incorporate a bank did not have to be debated be-
 
 323. Id. at 506. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 512. 
 326. Id. at 499. 
 327. Id. at 503. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 508. 
 330. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 233. 
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cause it had been so freely and frequently discussed that legis-
lators had made up their minds on the issue.331 The questions to 
be addressed were the practical questions of whether and what 
kind of bank Congress should establish.332 
While the constitutionality of a national bank was a settled 
question generally, one important legislator took until 1816 to 
change his mind. As a U.S. Senator, Henry Clay opposed ex-
tending the charter of the First Bank in 1811, in part, on con-
stitutional grounds. In 1816, as Speaker of the House, he sup-
ported the bank and Congress’s constitutional authority to 
charter it. His changed view stemmed from the theories that 
Congress possesses the power to legislate to meet the nation’s 
exigencies; that Congress possesses the power to fulfill “many 
of the objects specifically enumerated in the Constitution,” in-
definable in their nature though they may be; and his ac-
ceptance of a developmental theory of a living Constitution.333 
Though the Constitution never changes and is always the 
same, he conceded, “the force of circumstances, and the lights of 
experience, may evolve to the fallible persons charged with its 
administration, the fitness and necessity of a particular exer-
cise of constructive power to-day, which they did not see at a 
former period.”334 This necessity “may not be perceived, at one 
time, under one state of things, when it is perceived, at another 
time, under a different state of things.”335 
The House passed the bank bill on March 14, 1816.336 The 
Senate passed the bank bill with minor amendments on April 
3, 1816 by an almost two-to-one vote of twenty-two to twelve.337 
The House concurred in the Senate amendments and enacted 
the bill two days later.338 President Madison signed the bill into 
law a week later, on April 10, 1816. 
G. ECONOMIC, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN 
CONGRESS 
The political alignments on the question of incorporating 
the Second Bank in 1816 were the opposite to the alignments 
 
 331. Id. at 234–35. 
 332. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1060 (1816) (statement of Rep. Calhoun). 
 333. Id. at 1191–92 (statement of Speaker Clay). 
 334. Id. at 1192. 
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 336. Id. at 1219. 
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regarding the creation of First Bank in 1791. The Second Bank 
was similar to the First Bank adopted by the Federalists in 
1791, and the Federalists had not changed their views on bank-
ing in 1816. Nevertheless, Daniel Webster and the Federalists 
voted against the Second Bank.339 Bray Hammond character-
ized Webster’s and the Federalists’ opposition to the Second 
Bank as captious and motivated by “partisanship rather than 
principle.”340 Republican policy, on the other hand, had changed 
fundamentally. The party “had got into a position where a na-
tional Bank was as essential to it as it had been to the Federal-
ists twenty-five years before.”341 With some exceptions in both 
parties, the incorporation of the Second Bank was a Republican 
measure enacted over the opposition of the Federalists.342 
Geographical alignments also switched.343 In 1791, the 
North supported the incorporation of the First Bank, and the 
South opposed it.344 In 1816, the South and West established 
the Second Bank and the North opposed it.345 The senators and 
representatives from the states of New England and the mid-
Atlantic opposed the Second Bank by a vote of forty-four to fif-
ty-three.346 Those of the southern and western states voted for it 
by an almost two to one margin of fifty-eight to thirty.347 Virgin-
ia was the only southern state a majority of whose federal legis-
lators voted against the bank, but it was a majority of one: ten 
to eleven.348 The majority of legislators from only three of the 
nine northern states voted for the Second Bank: New Jersey, 
New York and Rhode Island.349 Hammond concluded that this 
vote in 1816 was more regional than either of the votes in 1791 
and 1811.350 
Unfortunately, the Second Bank was operated in a politi-
cally partisan manner. It was mismanaged and failed to comply 
with its charter obligations. It did not perform its restraining 
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functions as a central bank.351 The Second Bank’s actions inten-
sified the economic contraction that led to the economic depres-
sion and the Panic of 1819.352 Congress considered but ultimate-
ly rejected proposals to repeal the Second Bank’s charter in 
early 1819.353 
The Second Bank engendered deep bitterness that persist-
ed in many parts of the country long after the economic recov-
ery that followed the depression of 1819. Senator Thomas Hart 
Benton of Missouri declaimed in 1832, “[a]ll the flourishing cit-
ies of the West are mortgaged to this moneyed power. They 
may be devoured by it at any moment. They are in the jaws of 
the monster! A lump of butter in the mouth of a dog! One gulp, 
one swallow, and all is gone!”354 
Political leaders felt justified in trying to eliminate the Se-
cond Bank by taxing the bank’s branches located in their 
states. Ironically, Maryland did not tax the Second Bank’s Bal-
timore branch for this reason; rather, it taxed the branch to 
raise revenue.355 This helps to explain the government’s deci-
sion to challenge Maryland’s tax in a test case. 
V.  MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND   
McCulloch v. Maryland arose when James McCulloch, 
cashier of the Baltimore branch of Second Bank, refused to pay 
an annual tax of $15,000 or a tax of two percent on the notes 
issued by the Second Bank which the state of Maryland im-
posed on any bank not chartered by the state.356 The case pre-
sented two questions: whether Congress possessed the constitu-
tional authority to charter the Second Bank; and whether the 
tax Maryland imposed on Second Bank was constitutional. The 
case’s deeper significance lay in the fact that opposing counsel 
presented to the Court for resolution the conflicting inherent 
national sovereignty and state sovereignty theories of Ameri-
can constitutionalism that the political branches of the gov-
ernment had been debating since the First Congress.357 
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The court reporter acknowledged that McCulloch’s signifi-
cance transcended the legal questions presented for decision.358 
The Court was to decide fundamental questions concerning the 
nature of the Constitution, congressional powers, American 
federalism, and national and state sovereignty. 
Each side was allowed three attorneys rather than the 
usual two, and oral arguments were made over ten days, Feb-
ruary 22 to 27 and March 1 to 3.359 The reporter summarized 
the arguments over seventy-eight pages,360 just over twice the 
length of the Court’s thirty-seven page opinion by Chief Justice 
Marshall. Opposing counsel repeated the conflicting theories of 
American constitutionalism and arguments regarding the 
bank’s constitutionality that were made in the congressional 
debates of 1791, 1810–1811 and 1814, 1815–1816 and in Presi-
dent Washington’s cabinet in 1791.361 
Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the legal gravity and 
political and sectional divisiveness engendered by these issues 
and the profoundly important questions of constitutional con-
struction they involved.362 The public also recognized the im-
portance of the questions raised in this case.363 
The Court affirmed national sovereignty constitutionalism 
and its theory of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers that 
bank supporters had argued since 1791. The Court rejected the 
strict construction constitutionalism and its theory of state sov-
ereignty argued by bank opponents in these debates. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s opinion closely tracked Alexander Hamilton’s 
arguments, which were adopted by the bank’s attorneys, par-
ticularly by William Pinkney, whom Marshall regarded as “the 
 
 358. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 322 n.3 (1819). See 
supra note 5 and accompanying text for the importance of McCulloch’s impact 
on the Court’s jurisprudence. 
 359. Id. 
 360. See generally id. 
 361. See id. at 322–40. 
 362. Id. at 400–01. 
 363. The NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER reported that “[t]he argument has in-
volved some of the most important principles of constitutional law which have 
been discussed with an equal degree of learning and eloquence and have con-
stantly attracted the attention of a numerous and intelligent auditory,” and 
the Court’s decision “is anxiously expected.” WARREN, supra note 223, at 508 
(quoting NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1819). The NILES REGISTER similarly 
informed its readers that the McCulloch case “involves some of the most im-
portant principles of constitutional law and the decision is anxiously ex-
pected.” Id. (quoting NILES REG., Feb. 27, 1819). 
  
2016] INHERENT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 757 
 
greatest man he had ever seen in a Court of justice.”364 Justice 
Story, not one to give high praise, gushed over Pinkney’s argu-
ment in McCulloch: “I never, in my whole life, heard a greater 
speech; it was worth a journey from Salem to hear it . . . his el-
oquence was overwhelming.”365 This helps to explain the alacri-
ty with which the Court issued its decision. Chief Justice Mar-
shall issued his opinion just four days after the end of days of 
oral arguments.366 
A. POLITICAL PRACTICE AS A METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, 
first took up the question of the bank’s constitutionality. But 
before he began his analysis of this issue, he asserted principles 
of constitutional construction that affirmed the national sover-
eignty constitutionalism that First and Second Bank congres-
sional supporters had argued since the First Congress. 
The Chief Justice began his opinion by asserting that polit-
ical practice is an authoritative method of interpreting the 
Constitution and the constitutionality of Congress’s legislative 
actions. Marshall declared that doubtful questions regarding 
the powers of the people’s representatives, “in the decision of 
which the great principles of liberty are not concerned . . . if not 
put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a 
considerable impression from that practice.”367 Affirming Con-
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gress’s authority to interpret its constitutional powers, Mar-
shall declared: “An exposition of the constitution, deliberately 
established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an im-
mense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly dis-
regarded.”368 This doctrine is possible only if Congress possesses 
inherent sovereign powers. It is utterly impossible under strict 
construction constitutionalism. 
McCulloch was not the first time the Court used political 
practice as an authoritative explication of the Constitution’s 
meaning. Six days after it had decided Marbury v. Madison,369 
the Supreme Court unanimously decided Stuart v. Laird with 
the observation “that practice and acquiescence under it for a 
period of several years, commencing with the organization of 
the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has in-
deed fixed the [constitutional] construction”370 that determined 
the result. 
Political practice was used as authority most recently in 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, in which Justice Stephen Breyer stated 
that, “[i]n light of some linguistic ambiguity, the basic purpose 
of the [Recess Appointments] Clause, and the historical practice 
we have described, we conclude that the phrase ‘all vacancies’ 
includes vacancies that come into existence while the Senate is 
in session.”371 In this case, Justice Breyer cited as authority 
Mistretta v. United States, which in turn quoted Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s “gloss on the executive power” theory of constitu-
tional interpretation.372 
Justice Frankfurter’s “gloss” theory is an extension of Chief 
Justice Marshall’s approach to interpreting the Constitution by 
using political practice. Frankfurter cited McCulloch for “a spa-
cious view” of the Constitution and declared that 
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in 
by the Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our 
government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in 
the President by § 1 of Art. II.373 
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In the same case, Justice Robert Jackson articulated his 
tripartite approach to interpreting constitutionality of presi-
dential actions on the basis of the interaction between Congress 
and the executive over time. Jackson derived this approach 
from the same theory of constitutional construction based on 
political practice.374 As a Supreme Court Justice, William 
Rehnquist explained the Court’s decision in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan,375 relying on a refined version of Justice Jackson’s tri-
partite analysis and Justice Frankfurter’s gloss on executive 
powers theory. Chief Justice John Roberts also used these theo-
ries in explaining the Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas.376 
Justice Antonin Scalia recognized “constitutional practice” as 
persuasive authority in United States v. Printz, when he de-
clared that “[t]he constitutional practice we have examined 
above tends to negate the existence of the congressional power 
asserted here,” though it was not conclusive.377 
B. CONTEMPORANEOUS EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION AS 
AUTHORITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
Political practice was of special significance in McCulloch. 
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the challenged legislative 
power was exercised initially by the First Congress when it 
chartered the First Bank in 1791 for a period of twenty years 
after a zealous and able legislative debate.378 The bank bill was 
then debated in the cabinet of President George Washington 
“with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever ex-
perienced, and being supported by arguments which convinced 
minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast, it 
became a law,” the Chief Justice recounted.379 Allowed to expire 
in 1811, the short experience without the national bank ex-
posed the government to financial embarrassments, Marshall 
noted, which “convinced those who were most prejudiced 
against the measure [in 1791] of its necessity, and induced the 
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passage of the present law [in 1816].”380 This was a not-too-
veiled reference to James Madison—who, as President, signed 
the Second Bank bill into law—and Madison’s Democratic Re-
publican supporters. Having reviewed this legislative and polit-
ical history, Marshall repeated the authority of political prac-
tice and consequent deferential standard of judicial review: “It 
would require no ordinary share of intrepidity, to assert that a 
measure adopted under these circumstances, was a bold and 
plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no counte-
nance.”381 Marshall added that the court would find the chal-
lenged statute constitutional even if it were a case of first im-
pression. 
C. DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Another principle of national sovereignty constitutionalism 
is judicial deference to the political process in interpreting con-
stitutional powers, with the exception of powers relating to in-
dividual liberties. From the Founding through the Civil War 
and Reconstruction, the Supreme Court was deferential to 
Congress—recognizing its delegated powers as broad, plenary, 
and supreme—and to the political process in affirming the con-
stitutionality of federal statutes.382 The Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional only two federal statutes prior to the Civil 
War: Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in Marbury v. 
Madison and the Compromise of 1820 in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford.383 It declared unconstitutional thirty-one state statutes in 
this period, which supports the view that the Supreme Court’s 
power of judicial review was originally understood as a federal 
judicial protection of federal law from state infringements. The 
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LIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEAN-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION 235 (2009); KRAMER, supra note 132; WILLIAM E. 
NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW 82 (2000); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CON-
STITUTION 125 (1990). 
 383. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
  
2016] INHERENT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 761 
 
Court did not embark upon an activist judicial review of federal 
statutes, as we understand it today, until the 1860s and 1870s. 
Chief Justice Marshall grounded the Court’s deference to 
Congress on the doctrine of political practice. He wrote that, in 
cases such as the one before the court, in which Congress had 
previously exercised the challenged power of incorporating a 
bank, in which subsequent congresses affirmed the power 
through supporting legislation, and in which the courts decided 
cases concerning the bank as if it were constitutional without 
actually deciding its constitutionality, the constitutionality of 
the statute “can scarcely be considered as an open question.”384 
To declare such a legislative act unconstitutional, Marshall 
opined, it would have to be “a bold and daring usurpation.”385 
Marshall said this would have been the standard of review 
even if the issue were an open question. “A bold and daring 
usurpation” is an extraordinarily high standard that would in-
frequently justify a court’s finding that a federal statute is un-
constitutional. 
Notably, the Chief Justice acknowledged that the power to 
incorporate a national bank is not among the enumerated pow-
ers delegated to Congress in Article I. He explained, however, 
that the national government’s powers greatly transcend the 
powers enumerated in Article I for several reasons. 
D. POWERS IMPLIED FROM THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT 
One reason Marshall cited for Congress’s inherent powers 
is the text of the Constitution. Unlike the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the Constitution does not expressly “[exclude] incidental 
or implied powers; and [require] that everything granted [to the 
national government] shall be expressly and minutely de-
scribed.”386 Even the Tenth Amendment does not contain the 
word “expressly,” Marshall observed, but leaves the question 
“to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument.”387 
 
 384. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401 (1819). McCulloch’s attorneys 
had argued this theory to the Court. See id. at 325–26 (Webster); id. at 357 
(Attorney General Writ); id. at 386–87 (Pinkney). 
 385. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. Marshall suggested an equally 
high standard of review in Marbury when he declared that “an act of the legis-
lature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
Though he embraced state sovereignty, strict constructionist constitutional-
ism, Thomas Jefferson was nevertheless deferential to Congress regarding 
doubtful questions of constitutionality. See MALONE, supra note 43, at 280. 
 386. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406. 
 387. Id. The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the 
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He interpreted the Tenth Amendment to mean that Congress 
may exercise a power to achieve its objects or ends so long as 
the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit it or reserve the 
power to the states or to the people.388 
The Court’s construction of the Tenth Amendment is the 
exact opposite of the construction adopted by the Supreme 
Court today.389 Maryland’s attorney general, Luther Martin, 
had interpreted the Tenth Amendment as it is understood to-
day and argued that a power not delegated to the United States 
nor prohibited to the states “is, therefore, reserved to the 
states, or to the people.”390 The Court unanimously rejected this 
reading of the Tenth Amendment. Marshall’s analysis opens 
the question of what is the source of Congress’s inherent pow-
ers. 
E. POWERS IMPLIED FROM THE NATURE OF A WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 
A second reason Marshall offered to explain Congress’s in-
herent powers is the nature of the U.S. Constitution. The Court 
concluded that the nature of written constitutions generally 
precludes the possibility of specifying all of the powers a gov-
ernment may exercise. The Chief Justice elaborated: 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of 
which its great powers will admit and of all the means by which they 
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal 
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, 
probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, re-
quires, [sic] that only its great outlines should be marked, its im-
portant objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose 
those objects, be deduced from the nature of those objects them-
selves.391 
 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 388. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316. The bank’s attorneys inter-
preted the Tenth Amendment in the same way. See, e.g., id. at 384–85 
(Pinkney’s argument). See supra notes 98–105, 260–65 for citations to con-
gressional debates on this issue. 
 389. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2572 
(2012); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 
(2000). 
 390. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 374. Hopkinson argued that the 
states reserve all powers “that are not expressly prohibited, or necessarily ex-
cluded.” Id. at 338. 
 391. Id. at 407. Marshall’s explanation parrots the view of Charles 
Pinkney. See id. at 385. Attorney General Wirt held similar views. See id. at 
356–57. 
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Notice that the Chief Justice refers to “objects” and not 
“powers” that the Constitution designates from which Con-
gress’s unstated powers might be deduced. 
Marshall attributed this understanding to the framers of 
the U.S. Constitution, which he inferred from the Constitu-
tion’s text. “That this idea was entertained by the framers of 
the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the 
nature of the instrument, but from the language,” Marshall 
opined.392 “Why else were some of the limitations, found in the 
ninth section of the 1st article, introduced?”393 Article I, Section 
9 is a litany of prohibitions on Congress’s legislative powers, 
such as prohibiting Congress from suspending the writ of habe-
as corpus except in specified cases, from enacting bills of at-
tainder and ex post facto laws, and many other actions. “In con-
sidering this question, then, we must never forget, [sic] that it 
is a Constitution we are expounding,”394 Marshall emphasized 
in a much-quoted statement. 
F. IMPLIED POWERS INHERENT IN CONGRESS AS A SOVEREIGN 
LEGISLATURE 
A third reason the Constitution authorizes Congress to ex-
ercise inherent powers has generally been overlooked by schol-
ars and jurists: it is the nature of Congress as a sovereign legis-
lature. Marshall asserted this theory of national sovereignty 
constitutionalism in refuting the argument that Congress does 
not possess the power to charter a corporation because the 
power of incorporation is a sovereign power, and the only sov-
ereign powers Congress may exercise are those enumerated in 
Article I.395 “On what foundation does this argument rest,” Mar-
shall asked rhetorically. He answered: “On this alone: the pow-
er of creating a corporation is one appertaining to sovereignty, 
and is not expressly conferred on Congress.”396 Conceding “This 
is true,” Marshall rebutted the argument by emphasizing the 
sovereign nature of Congress and its legislative powers, both 
expressly enumerated and inherent: 
 
 392. Id. at 407. 
 393. Id. Marshall’s reference is to Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. 
 394. Id. at 407. Marshall’s constitutional construction echoes that of Alex-
ander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 152–57 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 395. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409. 
 396. Id. 
  
764 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:699 
 
But all legislative powers appertain to sovereignty. The original pow-
er of giving the law on any subject whatever, is a sovereign power; 
and if the government of the Union is restrained from creating a cor-
poration, as a means for performing its functions, on the single reason 
that the creation of a corporation is an act of sovereignty; . . . there 
would be some difficulty in sustaining the authority of congress to 
pass other laws for the accomplishment of the same objects. The gov-
ernment which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it, the 
duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, 
be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may not 
select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of effecting 
the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of establish-
ing that exception.397 
Given Congress’s sovereignty, Marshall said the Court 
could not “well comprehend the process of reasoning which 
maintains, that a power appertaining to sovereignty cannot be 
connected with that vast portion of it which is granted to the 
general government, so far as it is calculated to subserve the 
legitimate objects of that government.”398 In other words, it is to 
“subserve” the federal government’s legitimate objects that 
Congress may exercise its explicitly delegated and inherent 
sovereign powers. 
Chief Justice Marshall asserted here a doctrine of implied 
powers inherent in the sovereign nature of the national gov-
ernment generally and of Congress specifically. In other words, 
as a sovereign legislature Congress possesses sovereign legisla-
tive powers that are inherent in all sovereign governments, but 
Congress is limited in exercising these powers to those ends 
and objects for which it was created. These ends and objects are 
stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, the powers enu-
merated in Article I, and throughout the Constitution. 
The doctrine of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers ex-
plains why the Chief Justice repeatedly stated that Congress 
possesses unenumerated powers to accomplish the objects and 
ends for which the Constitution was adopted and the national 
government was created instead of limiting these powers to 
those that are necessarily implied in semantic definitions of the 
 
 397. Id. at 409–10. The bank’s attorneys argued inherent sovereignty con-
stitutionalism. See id. at 323 (Webster); id. at 358 (Attorney General Wirt); id. 
at 382–83 (William Pinkney). For explicit congressional sources of the inher-
ent sovereignty theory, see supra notes 56–99, 171–83, 260–65, and accompa-
nying text. For Alexander Hamilton’s assertion of the inherent sovereignty 
theory, see supra notes 195–216 and accompanying text. 
 398. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 410–11. 
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enumerated powers of Article I.399 Inherent sovereign powers is 
the reason why political practice can become an authoritative 
construction of the Constitution. It also explains why Congress 
may exercise unenumerated powers to address national needs 
and exigencies apart from those implied from enumerated pow-
ers.400 
G. CONGRESS’S INHERENT SOVEREIGN POWERS ILLUSTRATED 
WITH ITS PENAL POWERS 
Marshall explained the Court’s understanding of Congress 
as a sovereign legislature that may exercise inherent sovereign 
powers with a discussion of Congress’s penal powers. He ob-
served that “[a]ll admit, that the government may, legitimately, 
punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this [penal power] is 
not among the enumerated powers of congress.”401 Indeed, Mar-
shall declared that the power to punish violations of the law 
“might be denied, with the more plausibility [than the power to 
incorporate a bank], because it is expressly given in some cas-
es.”402 He asked, therefore, “whence arises the power to punish, 
in cases not prescribed by the constitution?” And Marshall an-
swered: “All admit, that the government may, legitimately, 
punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the 
enumerated powers of congress.” Moreover, Congress’s powers 
“may exist and be carried into execution, although no punish-
ment should be inflicted, in cases where the right to punish is 
not expressly given.”403 
 
 399. See supra notes 391–400 and accompanying text; infra notes 401–07, 
414–21, and accompanying text. 
 400. See infra notes 444–91 and accompanying text. 
 401. McCulloch, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) at 416. 
 402. Id. Article I, Section 8 delegates the power to punish in two situations: 
Clause 6 authorizes Congress “[t]o provide for the Punishment of counterfeit-
ing the Securities and current Coin of the United States,” and Clause 10 au-
thorizes Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 6, cl. 10. 
 403. McCulloch, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) at 416–17. Marshall offered two illus-
trations of Congress’s unenumerated penal powers: he implied Congress’s 
power to punish mail theft from the government’s “implied power” to carry the 
mails on post-roads from one post-office to another, implied from Congress’s 
power to establish post-offices and post-roads. The other illustration is Con-
gress’s power to punish crimes of stealing or falsifying records or process of a 
federal court, or committing perjury in such a court. “To punish these offences, 
is certainly conducive to the due administration of justice,” Marshall opined, 
but it is not necessary to the existence and functioning of these courts. Id. 
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The reason Congress may exercise inherent sovereign pe-
nal powers, even when it is not necessary, is that “[t]he good 
sense of the public has pronounced, without hesitation, that the 
power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be ex-
ercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental 
to his constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into exe-
cution all sovereign powers.”404 A means to carry into execution 
all sovereign powers is Hamilton’s definition of “resulting” 
powers, which Hamilton claimed Congress possesses in addi-
tion to powers implied from Congress’s enumerated powers.405 
And when may the federal government exercise its sovereign 
powers? Marshall said that Congress may legislate not only to 
effectuate its enumerated powers but whenever Congress 
deems it necessary to achieve an object or end delegated to it by 
the Constitution.406 The end or object the Chief Justice hypothe-
sized Congress may achieve through its penal powers is the 
administration of justice, which the Preamble states is one of 
the ends for which the people created the Constitution.407 
H. DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMPLIED POWERS AND GREAT 
SUBSTANTIVE AND INDEPENDENT POWERS IN MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND 
Chief Justice Marshall clarified the nature of Congress’s 
inherent sovereign powers when he explained the distinction 
between these unenumerated powers and Congress’s “great 
substantive and independent” sovereign powers that are enu-
merated in Article I.408 Their enumeration in the Constitution 
identifies these powers as great substantive and independent 
powers as well as some of the “objects” or “ends” for which the 
national government was established.409 However, implied or 
incidental sovereign powers are so numerous they could not be 
explicitly enumerated.410 The power to charter a corporation, 
 
 404. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418. Representative Elias Boudinot 
used the penal power illustration in House debates relating to the First Bank 
in 1791, but he said they were implied in Congress’s power to establish federal 
courts. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 405. Hamilton defined “resulting powers” in his opinion on the constitu-
tionality of the First Bank. See supra notes 203–16 and accompanying text. 
 406. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at 411. 
 409. Id. at 411–13. 
 410. Id. at 411. The bank’s attorneys made arguments reflected in portions 
of Marshall’s opinion analyzed in this section. See id. at 423–25 (Webster); id. 
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though a sovereign power, Marshall explained, is not “a great 
substantive and independent power” because it is not specifical-
ly enumerated like the powers to make war, to levy taxes or to 
regulate commerce.411 
But, in what sense are enumerated powers “independent” 
powers? Marshall’s answer is that they are ends or objects in 
themselves and may be exercised independently of the other 
enumerated powers and other objects or ends for which the 
Constitution was adopted and the national government was es-
tablished. These enumerated powers may be exercised “in any 
case whatever.”412 They are independent also because they 
“cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a 
means of executing them.”413 
An implied sovereign power, such as the power to charter a 
corporation, on the other hand, “is never the end for which oth-
er powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects are 
accomplished.”414 The power to charter a corporation “is never 
used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting some-
thing else.”415 Had the framers “intended to grant this power as 
one which should be distinct and independent, to be exercised in 
any case whatever, it would have found a place among the 
enumerated powers of the government,”416 Marshall elaborated. 
This statement suggests why the enumerated powers are “great 
substantive and independent power[s].”417 Having been express-
ly delegated to Congress, they are plenary powers that Con-
gress may exercise for their own sake.418 An implied sovereign 
power, however, is a means to accomplish something else, such 
as an “object,” an “end,” or to carry into execution some enu-
merated power.419 The court considered powers implied from the 
sovereign nature of Congress to be a “vast mass of incidental 
powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that in-
strument be not a splendid bauble.”420 Consequently, Marshall 
 
at 357 (Attorney General Wirt); and id. at 384–85 (Pinkney). 
 411. Id. at 411. 
 412. See id. at 421. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added). 
 417. Id. at 411. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 421, 424. 
 420. Id. at 421. 
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concluded, “there could be no motive for particularly mention-
ing it” in the Constitution.421 
I. HOW THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS A GOVERNMENT OF 
LIMITED POWERS AND STILL POSSESSES A VAST MASS OF 
UNENUMERATED, IMPLIED POWERS 
Immediately after asserting that the Constitution neces-
sarily encompasses a “vast mass of incidental powers,” Mar-
shall declared that “all must admit, that the powers of the gov-
ernment are limited, and that its limits are not to be 
transcended.”422 Indeed, earlier in his opinion Marshall asserted 
that “[t]his government is acknowledged by all to be one of 
enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the 
powers granted to it, . . . is now universally admitted.”423 But 
then he also declared that a “sound construction of the consti-
tution must allow to the national legislature that discretion” as 
to the choice of means to carry into execution the powers it con-
fers upon Congress, “which will enable that body to perform the 
high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the 
people.”424 
The principle of a Constitution containing limited enumer-
ated sovereign powers as well as a “vast mass” of incidental 
sovereign powers is paradoxical. Marshall resolved this para-
dox in his McCulloch opinion and in one of his letters rebutting 
newspaper articles published in the Richmond Enquirer attack-
ing the Court’s McCulloch opinion.425 Judge Spencer Roane, 
writing as “Hampden” in his letters to the Richmond Enquirer, 
had argued in favor of the strict construction constitutionalism 
asserted by congressional bank opponents since 1791 and ar-
gued by Maryland’s counsel in McCulloch, which limited Con-
gress’s legislative powers to those expressly delegated in Article 
I and implied powers without which the enumerated powers 
 
 421. Id. at 422. The Court thus rejected James Madison’s and the congres-
sional bank opponents’ strict construction theories of Congress’s substantial 
and independent powers and of the power of incorporation as a substantial 
and independent power. See supra notes 73–97 and accompanying text. 
 422. Id. at 421. 
 423. Id. at 405. 
 424. Id. at 421. 
 425. Id. at 407; A Friend of the Constitution, Letter to the Editor, 
ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 1, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE 
OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 161–67 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter 
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE]. 
  
2016] INHERENT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 769 
 
could not be carried into effect.426 This argument concluded that 
there are no enumerated powers that require Congress to char-
ter a corporation to carry them into execution.427 Consequently, 
the power of incorporation “is not to be taken by implication.”428 
The McCulloch Court rejected this strict constitutional 
construction, and Chief Justice Marshall subsequently clarified 
the Court’s understanding of enumerated and incidental pow-
ers in response to Hampden’s newspaper attacks on the Court’s 
opinion. Marshall explained that an enumerated power is “[t]he 
power to do a thing” that includes “the power to carry that 
thing into execution.”429 They are “the same power, and the one 
cannot be termed with propriety ‘additional’ or ‘incidental’ to 
the other. . . . The execution is of the essence of the power.”430 
Marshall’s comments directly rejected Maryland’s and Hamp-
den’s conception of enumerated and implied powers.431 They al-
so conflict with contemporary understandings of powers im-
plied from enumerated powers.432 
Marshall explained the Court’s understanding of enumer-
ated and implied powers using the taxing power. He hypothe-
sized that, pursuant to its power to lay and collect taxes, Con-
gress enacts a law that lays taxes and provides for the 
collection and depositing of the tax money in the U.S. treas-
ury.433 This law “is not the exercise of an ‘additional power’ but 
the execution of one expressly granted.”434 In other words, laws 
that execute the granted power “are part of the original 
grant.”435 
 
 426. Hampden, Letter to the Editor, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 18, 1819, 
reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra note 425, at 125. 
 427. Id. 
 428. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 374 (quoting Maryland Attorney 
General Luther Martin).  
 429. A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 162. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 163 (“Hampden has been caught by the words ‘necessary,’ ‘with-
out which,’ and ‘only means,’ . . . so as to give them a weight not given by the 
author, . . . [a] great and obvious error . . . .”). 
 432. See United States v. Comstock, 130 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“We have 
since [McCulloch] made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and 
Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular 
federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power.”). 
 433. A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 162–63. 
 434. Id. at 162. 
 435. Id. at 163. 
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Were Congress to enact additional laws to punish those 
who refused to pay their taxes or to impose a preference on 
their estates for the collection of taxes or “other collateral pro-
visions,” such laws “may be traced to incidental powers.”436 So, 
incidental or implied powers are not essential to carry into exe-
cution enumerated powers; they are not part of the original 
grant. Rather, they support and facilitate the government in 
accomplishing the objectives of the enumerated powers. These 
implied powers are the “vast mass of incidental powers” Mar-
shall referred to in his McCulloch opinion when he explained 
why they could not be specifically enumerated. Moreover, these 
powers are sovereign powers that are inherent in government. 
Thus, the Court understood enumerated powers not only as au-
thorizations to perform some action but, more broadly, as ob-
jects and ends the national government was established to ac-
complish and which authorize Congress to exercise its inherent 
sovereign powers to achieve. The Court correspondingly reject-
ed Maryland’s strict construction of Article I as a list of sover-
eign powers and implied powers without which the enumerated 
powers could not be carried into execution to which Congress is 
limited in accomplishing the ends and objects the Constitution 
delegates to Congress. 
J. WHAT ARE THE LEGITIMATE ENDS AND OBJECTS AND DUTIES 
FOR WHICH CONGRESS MAY EXERCISE INHERENT SOVEREIGN 
POWERS? 
This raises the question of what are the legitimate ends 
and objects for which Congress may constitutionally exercise an 
inherent sovereign power. Certainly they are expressed in the 
enumerated powers of Article I and other provisions in the 
Constitution that explicitly authorize Congress to act, such as 
various sections of Article IV.437 
Chief Justice Marshall also quoted the Preamble to the 
Constitution as a statement of some of the objects and ends of 
the national government. He asserted that “[t]he government 
proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ 
in the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, ‘in 
order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure do-
mestic tranquillity [sic], and secure the blessings of liberty to 
 
 436. Id. 
 437. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress); id. 
art. IV, §§ 1, 3 (authorizing Congress to do certain acts). 
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themselves and to their posterity.’”438 Marshall also declared 
that “the government of the Union [is] sovereign with respect to 
those objects which . . . [the Constitution] intrusted to it, in rela-
tion to which its laws were declared [by the Constitution] to be 
supreme.”439 Marshall again referenced the Preamble as a 
statement of ends or objects in his response to Hampden’s chal-
lenge of the Court’s McCulloch opinion.440 Chief Justice Mar-
shall answered: 
“[B]y this new mode of amendment,” may that government which the 
American “people have ordained and established, in order to form a 
more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and se-
cure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity,” be-
come an inanimate corpse, incapable of effecting any of these ob-
jects.441 
The Chief Justice asserted that the Court could not under-
stand the line of reasoning in which “a power appertaining to 
sovereignty . . . [that] is calculated to subserve the legitimate 
objects of that government” could not be exercised by Congress 
simply because it is not explicitly delegated in its Constitu-
tion.442 Thus, several times Marshall declared that Congress 
may exercise implied sovereign powers to accomplish an object 
or achieve an end for which the Constitution was adopted and 
the national government was established in addition to carry 
into execution enumerated powers.443 
K. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AS A DYNAMICALLY 
EVOLVING, POWER-ENHANCING DOCUMENT 
The McCulloch opinion thus described the Constitution as 
a dynamically evolving, power-enhancing document whose 
scope and meaning are to be determined through the actions of 
the political branches of the government it established, primar-
ily Congress. Chief Justice Marshall suggested this under-
 
 438. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–04 (emphasis 
added); A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 160. 
 439. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410 (emphasis added). Congressional 
proponents of the First Bank made and debated this argument in the First 
Congress. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text. 
 440. A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 160. 
 441. Id. 
 442. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410–11 (emphasis added). 
 443. See id. at 409–12, 418–19, 423–24 (showing Marshall declaring that 
Congress may exercise implied sovereign powers to accomplish an object or 
achieve an end). 
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standing early in his opinion when he spoke of the nature of a 
written Constitution as designating “only its great outlines . . . , 
its important objects,” and leaving “the minor ingredients 
which compose those objects [to] be deduced [by Congress] from 
the nature of th[ose] objects themselves.”444 He also said the 
Congress would deduce its powers from its experience in meet-
ing national exigencies as they arise from unforeseen circum-
stances over time.445 Understandably, Marshall declared that, 
although the national government is a government of enumer-
ated powers, which may not be transcended, “the question re-
specting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetu-
ally arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our 
system shall exist.”446 This conception of the Constitution as an 
evolving framework of government explains why this question 
will continue to arise. 
L. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE DELEGATES “IMPLIED” 
ENUMERATED AND INHERENT SOVEREIGN POWERS 
Marshall, for the most part, based his understanding of 
Congress’s constitutional powers on “general reasoning,” at-
tributing Congress’s implied sovereign legislative powers to the 
nature of the written Constitution and the nature of Congress 
as a sovereign legislature.447 The reasons he specified had noth-
ing to do with the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, the 
Chief asserted that even “in the absence of this clause, Congress 
. . . might employ those [means] which, in its judgment, would 
most advantageously effect the object to be accomplished.”448 
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice declared: “But the 
[C]onstitution of the United States has not left the right of Con-
gress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the 
powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its 
enumeration of powers is added” the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.449 In other words, the Necessary and Proper Clause ex-
plicitly authorizes Congress to exercise inherent sovereign 
 
 444. Id. at 407. 
 445. See infra notes 473–74 and accompanying text. 
 446. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405. 
 447. See id. at 407 (“[The Constitution’s] nature, therefore, requires, that 
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and 
the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the na-
ture of the objects themselves.”). 
 448. Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
 449. Id. at 411–12 (emphasis added). 
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powers which Congress possesses even without this express 
delegation.450 
Marshall evidently derived the principle of constitutional 
authorization and limitation of Congress’s inherent legislative 
powers from James Madison’s Federalist No. 44 and Alexander 
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 23. In McCulloch, Marshall declared: 
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the con-
stitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional.”451 The Chief Justice repeated that “any means adapted 
to the end, any means which tended directly to the execution of 
the constitutional powers of the government, were in them-
selves constitutional.”452 In other words, Congress’s exercise of a 
sovereign power that is not explicitly delegated is constitutional 
if that legislation is appropriate to further some end or accom-
plish some object the Constitution delegates to the national 
government or to carry into execution one or more of Congress’s 
enumerated powers, so long as the Constitution does not explic-
itly prohibit Congress from exercising the power or explicitly 
reserve the power to the states or to the people. 
Marshall’s opinion here appears directly to paraphrase 
Madison’s Federalist No. 44. Madison declared that, had the 
Constitution not included the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
[T]here can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as 
means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the 
government by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly es-
tablished in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, 
the means are authorised; wherever a general power to do a thing is 
given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.453 
Note that Marshall and Madison referred both to ends and 
powers as authorizing Congress’s unenumerated powers. Madi-
son had just explained that it would have been ineffective and 
 
 450. Id. at 412–13. The Necessary and Proper Clause is the last of the pow-
ers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 and states that “Congress shall have 
power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Of-
ficer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 451. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
 452. Id. at 419. 
 453. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). Alexander Hamilton made the same point. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, 
at 153, 155–56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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impracticable to list every implied power.454 He punctuated the 
point by asserting that, had the framers “attempted to enumer-
ate the particular powers or means, not necessary or proper for 
carrying the general powers into execution, the task would 
have been no less chimerical.”455 
Chief Justice Marshall repeated his interpretation of con-
gressional powers based on general reasoning when he ana-
lyzed the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.456 How-
ever, he focused primarily, but not exclusively, on elaborating 
the scope of Congress’s powers implied from its enumerated 
powers.457 This emphasis was necessitated by the constitutional 
interpretation asserted by Maryland’s legal counsel. Marshall 
noted that they had argued that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, which he thought is literally a delegation of power, “is 
really restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be 
implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated pow-
ers.”458 
Conceding that the Constitution delegates sovereign pow-
ers to Congress, Maryland’s counsel insisted that the nature of 
the sovereign powers delegated to Congress “is modified by the 
terms of the grant under which it was given. They do not im-
port sovereign power generally, but sovereign power limited to 
particular cases.”459 Consequently, the word “necessary” con-
trols the Necessary and Proper Clause and limits Congress’s 
implied powers “to such as are indispensable, and without 
which the [enumerated] power would be nugatory. That it ex-
cludes the choice of means, and leaves to Congress, in each 
case, that only which is most direct and simple.”460 Thus, “the 
question again recurs, whether sovereign power was given in 
this particular case.”461 The answer to this question, Maryland 
argued, is “whether the establishment of a banking corporation 
 
 454. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 284–85. 
 455. Id. at 285. 
 456. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419 (“[I]n the absence of this [Neces-
sary and Proper] Clause, congress would have some choice of means. That it 
might employ those which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect 
the object to be accomplished. That any means adapted to the end . . . were in 
themselves constitutional.”). 
 457. See id. at 413–18 (elaborating the scope of Congress’s implied powers). 
 458. Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
 459. Id. at 363–67, 412. 
 460. Id. at 413. 
 461. Id. at 363. 
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be indispensably requisite to execute any of the express powers 
of the government?”462 Maryland’s answer was no.463 
The Court dismissed Maryland’s argument and held that 
the national government is sovereign with respect to its objects 
and ends to the same extent as the states are sovereign with 
respect to theirs, although state sovereignty is subordinated to 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.464 The Court re-
jected Maryland’s narrow interpretation of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause because it would deprive Congress of “the choice 
of means” by which it might carry into execution its enumerat-
ed powers and achieve the government’s ends and objects.465 
The Chief Justice offered several reasons for rejecting 
Maryland’s narrow interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. First, he noted that the subject of this clause was “th[e] 
great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially de-
pends.”466 The framers of the Constitution must have intended 
“to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their benefi-
cial execution” by adopting whatever means, that is, powers 
that “were conducive to the end” of securing the Nation’s wel-
fare.467 Maryland’s narrow interpretation of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause would deprive Congress of “the choice of means” 
by which it might carry into execution its enumerated powers 
and achieve the government’s ends and objects.468 
Second, Marshall noted that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is part of the Article I, Section 8 delegation of powers 
rather than the prohibitions of congressional powers in Section 
9.469 Its terms “purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers 
 
 462. Id. at 367 (emphasis omitted). 
 463. Id. at 412. Walter Jones had argued that “[t]he creation of a sovereign 
legislature implies an authority to pass laws to execute its given powers. This 
[Necessary and Proper] Clause is nothing more than a declaration of the au-
thority of Congress to make laws, to execute the powers expressly granted to 
it, and the other departments of the government.” Id. at 366 (emphasis omit-
ted). Jones insisted that “this clause shows that the intention of the Conven-
tion was[ ] to define the powers of the government with the utmost precision 
and accuracy.” Id. Jones defined the words “necessary and proper” to mean 
“indispensably requisite,” id. at 367, “to the accomplishment of the end in 
view.” Id. “To give it a more lax sense, would be to alter the whole character of 
the government as a sovereignty of limited powers.” Id. 
 464. Id. at 405–06. 
 465. Id. at 409–10, 413. 
 466. Id. at 415. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. at 413. 
 469. Id. at 419. 
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vested in the government. It purports to be an additional pow-
er, not a restriction on those already granted.”470 
In addition, Marshall repeated his understanding of the 
nature of a written constitution as a dynamically evolving, 
power-enhancing framework of government which delegates to 
Congress broad discretionary powers to adapt the Constitution 
to meet changing circumstances.471 He intoned how the Consti-
tution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequent-
ly, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”472 To 
have listed the voluminous “means by which government 
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been 
to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it 
the properties of a legal code.”473 
It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, 
for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, 
and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have declared 
that the best means shall not be used, but those alone, without which 
the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the 
legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its 
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.474 
Marshall here again declared that Congress is the institu-
tion that must adapt the Constitution to meet changing cir-
cumstances and to provide for unforeseen national exigencies. 
Marshall’s conception of the Constitution as a power-
enhancing framework of government also appears to have been 
taken from James Madison’s Federalist No. 44.475 In his discus-
sion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Madison explained 
why the powers conferred on the U.S. government are not lim-
ited to those expressly enumerated in the Constitution, as was 
the case in Article II of the Articles of Confederation.476 Madi-
son stated: 
Had the [constitutional] convention attempted a positive enumeration 
of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers in-
to effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws 
 
 470. Id. at 420. 
 471. Id. at 415. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. 
 474. Id. at 415–16 (emphasis added). But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Between these alternatives there is no middle 
ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other 
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.”).  
 475. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 453. 
 476. Id. at 284–85. 
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on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too 
not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes 
which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general 
power, the particular powers, which are the means of attaining the 
object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that 
object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the 
same.477 
Madison here identified two factors that explain the gov-
ernment’s unenumerated powers: the numerous possibilities of 
achieving the “objects” of the government as specified in its 
general powers; and the government’s need to “accommodate” 
its unspecified powers to changing circumstances in the future. 
Recall that Madison also asserted a theory of constitutional 
construction in Congress that identified Congress as the insti-
tution that is to adapt the Constitution to changing circum-
stances.478 As a member of the First Congress in 1789, Madison 
stated that doubtful questions of constitutional construction are 
to be resolved by Congress, and that questions relating to the 
apportionment of powers on which the Constitution is silent are 
to be submitted to Congress’s discretion.479 Madison cautioned 
his House colleagues to give careful consideration to such ques-
tions because Congress’s constitutional construction “will be-
come the permanent exposition of the Constitution.”480 
M. POWERS IMPLIED FROM NATIONAL NECESSITY OR EXIGENCY 
The Court held that national necessity or exigency is one of 
the sources of congressional power to legislate.481 Several times 
Marshall declared that Congress may exercise its implied sov-
ereign powers to meet national “necessities” or “exigencies.” For 
example, the Chief Justice explained that the bank statute be-
fore the court was enacted in 1816, in part, because “a short 
experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to re-
vive it [in 1811] exposed the government, convinced those who 
 
 477. Id. 
 478. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 479. Id. 
 480. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text; see also 1 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 461–62 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) 
(discussing the apportionment of power between the branches). 
 481. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–33, 435 (1920). Justice Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes grounded the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty of 1916 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 on national exigen-
cies and the national government’s inherent sovereign powers to meet them. 
Id.  
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were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity.”482 
The practical necessity of the bank convinced many who had 
originally opposed it on constitutional grounds of its constitu-
tionality: “So strongly have . . . [these views] been felt, that 
statesmen of the first class, whose previous opinions against it 
had been confirmed by every circumstance which can fix the 
human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies 
of the nation.”483 This was a transparent reference to James 
Madison and Democratic Republicans. 
N. “NECESSITY” UNDERSTOOD AS PRACTICAL NEED OR 
EXIGENCY 
In a number of places in his analysis, the Chief Justice’s 
use of “necessity” and “exigency” referred to the practical need 
for Congress to meet a pragmatic national objective rather than 
the degree of relationship between Congress’s action and its 
enumerated powers. Joseph Hopkinson, arguing for Maryland, 
conceded the constitutionality of the First Bank because it was 
a practical necessity in 1791.484 But he insisted that the Second 
Bank was not constitutional because a national bank was not 
necessary in 1819, and “a power, growing out of a necessity 
which may not be permanent, may also not be permanent.”485 
However, referring to the Second Bank, the Chief Justice said: 
“[W]ere its necessity less apparent, none can deny its being an 
appropriate measure; and if it is, the degree of its necessity, as 
has been very justly observed, is to be discussed in another 
place.”486 Marshall identified Congress as that other place and 
stated that the determination of the need to act is a legislative 
power and function and beyond the power of the judiciary.487 
The Chief Justice expressly declared that this discretion is ex-
clusively in Congress and not the Court: 
[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect 
any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to 
inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line 
 
 482. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819) (emphasis 
added). Marshall was referring to the nation’s experience in the War of 1812 
and financial distress it caused, which convinced those who had been most 
prejudiced against the bank in 1791 of its necessity in 1816 and induced the 
passage of the Second Bank. See supra notes 295–98 and accompanying text. 
 483. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422–23. 
 484. Id. at 331–333. 
 485. Id. at 331. 
 486. Id. at 423. 
 487. Id. 
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which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legisla-
tive ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.488 
The universal understanding of McCulloch among scholars 
today is that the Court established the doctrine of Congress’s 
implied powers as powers derived from its enumerated powers 
and recognized the constitutionality of the national bank as a 
legitimate exercise of such an implied power. If this doctrine 
was central to the court’s decision, one would expect Marshall 
to have identified the specific enumerated power or powers 
from which Congress’s power to charter the bank was implied. 
It is noteworthy and, in my view decisive in understanding the 
Court’s doctrine of Congress’s implied powers that Marshall did 
not identify any enumerated power from which Congress’s 
power to charter the Second Bank is implied. Clearly, scholars’ 
interpretation of McCulloch is problematic. 
The analysis presented here concludes that the court un-
derstood Congress’s power to charter the Second Bank to be one 
of the sovereign powers inherent in Congress to achieve the 
ends or objects the Constitution delegates to the national gov-
ernment. Congress’s penal power is another inherent sovereign 
power Marshall attributed to Congress. This analysis concludes 
that the court also based the constitutionality of the national 
bank on Congress’s inherent sovereign power to meet national 
necessities and exigencies. Marshall’s failure to tie Congress’s 
power to charter the bank to a specific enumerated power or 
powers supports this analysis. 
O. CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER IMPLIED FROM ITS 
SOVEREIGN NATURE IN ANDERSON V. DUNN 
Two years after McCulloch, the Court unanimously af-
firmed Congress’s contempt power in Anderson v. Dunn.489 Jus-
tice William Johnson wrote the Court’s opinion and borrowed 
theories of constitutional construction from Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s McCulloch opinion. Johnson employed the theory of 
Congress’s inherent sovereign powers and the theory of the 
Constitution as a power-enhancing, dynamically evolving 
framework of government developed through political practice 
in addition to a theory of Congress’s powers implied from enu-
merated powers.490 
 
 488. Id.  
 489. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). 
 490. See id. at 226. 
  
780 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:699 
 
Justice Johnson explained that it was impossible for the 
framers of the Constitution to have established “a system of 
government which would have left nothing to implication.”491 
Like Chief Justice Marshall, he described the Constitution as a 
power-enhancing, dynamically evolving framework of govern-
ment shaped by political experience.492 Johnson instructed: 
The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, in-
deed, that can be called a science which has but few fixed principles, 
and practically consists in little more than the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise. It is the 
science of experiment.493 
Consequently, “the relation between the [government’s] ac-
tion and the end [it is attempting to achieve], is not always so 
direct and palpable as to strike the eye of every observer.”494 
This is why the “maxim” of government “which necessarily 
rides over all others, in the practical application of government, 
. . . is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to ex-
ercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them.”495 
And, the “interests and dignity” of the people “require the exer-
tion of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends 
of their creation.”496 
Johnson explained that Congress’s power to find a private 
citizen in contempt of Congress is inherent in Congress and 
implied from the purposes, ends, and objects for which it was 
established.497 The judiciary also possesses the inherent power 
to fine and imprison for contempts although the Constitution 
does not expressly delegate it.498 Although the contempt power 
had been conferred on the courts by statute, the statute was “a 
legislative assertion of this right, as incidental to a grant of ju-
dicial power,” which the courts would have possessed in the ab-
sence of the statute.499 That is, the judiciary’s contempt power is 
inherent in the judicial power. 
The Court applied the same principle to Congress and af-
firmed its inherent power to punish all contempts of Congress 
even though the Constitution delegates to Congress the power 
 
 491. Id. at 225. 
 492. See id.  
 493. Id. at 226. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. at 227–28. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. 
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to punish only its own members for misbehavior in Congress.500 
Anderson had argued that the Constitution, in delegating to 
Congress the power to punish only its own members precludes 
Congress from punishing ordinary citizens for alleged actions 
outside of Congress.501 Johnson rejected the argument on “the 
ground [that it] is too broad, and the result too indefinite.”502 He 
explained that this “argument obviously . . . annihilat[es Con-
gress’s power] to guard itself from contempts, and leaves it ex-
posed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, ca-
price, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it.”503 That 
Anderson was a private citizen and not a member of Congress 
and that he committed his offense outside of Congress and not 
on the floor of Congress made no difference.504 “For why should 
the House be at liberty to exercise an ungranted, an unlimited, 
and undefined power within their walls, any more than without 
them,” Johnson queried rhetorically.505 
Like Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Johnson asserted 
Congress’s inherent sovereign power to affirm Congress’s 
unenumerated penal powers. He rejected the argument “that 
the express grant of [Congress’s] power to punish their mem-
bers . . . raises an implication against the power to punish any 
other than their own members.”506 Johnson replied that “[t]his 
argument proves too much, for its direct application would lead 
to the annihilation of almost every power of Congress.”507 Con-
sequently, “all the punishing power exercised by Congress in 
any cases, except those which relate to piracy and offences 
against the laws of nations, is derived from implication.”508 It 
never occurred to anyone “that the express grant in one class of 
cases repelled the assumption of the punishing power in any 
other.”509 “The truth is,” Johnson opined, giving the power to 
punish Congress’s own members “was of such a delicate nature, 
that a constitutional provision became necessary to assert or 
 
 500. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing in relevant part that “[e]ach 
house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for dis-
orderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member”). 
 501. Id. at 232–33. 
 502. Id. at 228. 
 503. Id. 
 504. Id. at 226–27. 
 505. Id. at 229. 
 506. Id. at 232–33. 
 507. Id. at 233. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. 
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communicate it.”510 But all assumed that Congress possessed 
the power to punish any other violator of its laws, Johnson de-
clared.511 Like Marshall, Johnson asserted a theory of Con-
gress’s penal powers as inherent in Congress’s nature as a sov-
ereign legislature. 
Justice Joseph Story echoed Marshall’s reasoning when he 
explained the theory of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers in 
his 1833 treatise, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States.512 Story called this “sort of implied power” by the 
same name used by Alexander Hamilton in his opinion on the 
bank, namely, a “resulting power.”513 Citing to Hamilton’s opin-
ion on the bank, Story defined resulting powers as those “aris-
ing from the aggregate powers of the national government.”514 
Story instructed that a resulting power is more “a result from 
the whole mass of the powers of the national government, and 
from the nature of political society, than a consequence or inci-
dent of the powers specially enumerated.”515 Story offered sev-
eral examples of these powers and declared that they are “nat-
ural incident[s], resulting from the sovereignty and character of 
the national government.”516 
 
 510. Id. 
 511. Id. at 226. 
 512. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 124–25 (1833) [hereinafter STORY COMMENTARIES]. 
 513. Id. at 124; see supra notes 202–16 and accompanying text (discussing 
Hamilton’s theory of resulting powers). 
 514. STORY COMMENTARIES, supra note 512, at 124. 
 515. Id. 
 516. Id. at 124–25 (citing Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172, 
181 (1818) (holding that the United States government has the right to enforce 
all contracts to which it is a party or “to recover damages for their violation, by 
actions in . . . [its] own name,” even though this power is not delegated to it or 
conferred by statute); United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 128 (1831) 
(“[Justice Story declaring that] we are of opinion that the United States have 
such a capacity to enter into contracts. It is in our opinion an incident to the 
general right of sovereignty; and the United States being a body politic, may, 
within the sphere of the constitutional powers confided to it, . . . enter into 
contracts not prohibited by law . . . . To adopt a different principle, would be to 
deny the ordinary rights of sovereignty.”); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 
Wheat.) 336, 390 (1818) (“[A] government which possesses the broad power of 
war; . . . has power to punish an offence committed by a marine on board a 
ship of war, wherever that ship may lie.”); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145–46 (1812) (holding that “a principle of public law” 
mandates “that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power 
open for their reception are to be considered as exempted by the consent of 
that power from its jurisdiction,” unless the sovereign destroys the immunity 
and exercises jurisdiction over such ships). 
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The Supreme Court grounded Congress’s power to issue 
paper currency on a theory of inherent sovereign powers in the 
Legal Tender Cases four decades later. Justice William Strong, 
writing for the Court, explained “that important powers were 
understood by the people who adopted the Constitution to have 
been created by it, powers not enumerated, and not included 
incidentally in any one of those enumerated.”517 He cited the 
Suspension Clause518 and the Bill of Rights,519 which deny to 
Congress powers that were not expressly granted and could not 
be implied from any other powers, as evidence “that, in the 
judgment of those who adopted the Constitution, there were 
powers created by it, neither expressly specified nor deducible 
from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which 
grew out of the aggregate of powers conferred upon the gov-
ernment, or out of the sovereignty instituted.”520 Justice Strong 
maintained that Congress had often exercised such inherent 
sovereign powers and noted that Justice Joseph Story, in his 
Commentaries on the Constitution, characterized such powers 
as “resulting powers, arising from the aggregate powers of the 
government.”521 Strong also could have cited Story’s source, Al-
exander Hamilton. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the national govern-
ment’s inherent sovereign powers in other areas of law, such as 
foreign affairs, eminent domain, and immigration.522 
P. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND STATES’ RIGHTS ARE SUBORDINATE 
TO NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
In deciding the second issue presented in McCulloch, 
whether Maryland’s tax on the Second Bank was constitution-
 
 517. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 532–39 (1870). 
 518. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”). 
 519. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
 520. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 535; see also id. at 555–56, 
561–64 (Bradley, J., concurring) (discussing the delegation of powers to Con-
gress). 
 521. Id. at 535. 
 522. See Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Con-
stitution, 82 FORDHAM. L. REV. 757, 775 (2013) (recognizing national govern-
ment’s inherent sovereign powers); Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the 
United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Origi-
nal and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States 
Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1833 (2004) (recognizing national 
government’s inherent sovereign powers). 
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al, Marshall asserted a doctrine of constitutional federalism 
that recognized the supremacy of national sovereignty over 
state sovereignty. Significantly, he acknowledged that a state’s 
power to tax is “one of vital importance,” that it “is essential to 
the very existence of government, and may be legitimately ex-
ercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost ex-
tent to which the government may chuse [sic] to carry it.”523 
Nevertheless, the Court held that “the sovereignty of the 
State, in the article of taxation itself, is subordinate to, and 
may be controlled by the constitution of the United States.”524 
The Court declared the state of Maryland’s tax unconstitutional 
on the basis of “[t]his great principle . . . that the [C]onstitution 
and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they 
control the [C]onstitution and laws of the respective States, and 
cannot be controlled by them.”525 Marshall declared Maryland’s 
tax unconstitutional on the principle of the supremacy of na-
tional sovereignty. He explained: 
It is of the very essence of [governmental] supremacy to remove all 
obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every 
power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own oper-
ations from their own influence. This effect need not be stated in 
terms. It is so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily 
implied in it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain. 
We must, therefore, keep it in view, while construing the constitu-
tion.526 
Q. REPRESENTATIVES’ ACCOUNTABILITY TO CONSTITUENTS 
CHECKS ABUSE OF POWER 
Chief Justice Marshall also applied the popular sovereign-
ty and republican theories of government to explain why a 
state’s tax on a national institution is unconstitutional. The 
state legislature derives its authority to tax from the people of 
the state, and it is the influence of the legislators’ constituents 
over them that guards their constituents against the abuse of 
the taxing power.527 But the institutions created by the national 
government “have no such security.”528 “Those . . . [institutions] 
are not given by the people of a particular State . . . which 
claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the States. 
 
 523. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425, 428 (1819). 
 524. Id. at 427. 
 525. Id. at 426. 
 526. Id. at 427. 
 527. Id. at 428. 
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They are given by all, for the benefit of all—and upon theory, 
should be subjected to that government only which belongs to 
all.”529 The people of a single state cannot delegate to the state’s 
legislature the power to tax “those means which are employed 
by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that 
body by the people of the United States.”530 In Congress “alone, 
are all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, there-
fore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling 
measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be 
abused.”531 Note that Marshall based this ruling on the assump-
tion that the remedy for the abuse of the taxing power was the 
political process in which legislators are held accountable to the 
people in elections, not judicial review. 
The theories Chief Justice Marshall espoused in McCulloch 
are extraordinary to the twenty-first century reader. But, they 
were familiar to Americans familiar with the debates relating 
to the First Bank and Second Bank in 1791, 1810–11, 1814–16. 
The Court’s decision did not end the political partisanship sur-
rounding the Second Bank, and the opposition to it persisted. 
The Second Bank was eventually “killed” by President Andrew 
Jackson in the 1830s. But that story must be left to another 
time. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article presents a detailed analysis of the constitu-
tional theories argued in the legislative histories of the First 
Bank and Second Bank of the U.S. and in the Supreme Court’s 
decision affirming the constitutionality of these institutions. 
This analysis demonstrates that inherent national sovereignty 
constitutionalism played an important role in the creation of 
these national banks and a decisive role in the Court’s McCul-
loch decision upholding Congress’s power to incorporate them. 
The evidence shows that the current, predominant interpreta-
tion of the original understanding of the Constitution and of 
the Court’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, that they estab-
lished a national government of a few enumerated powers, is 
incomplete, inaccurate and, in many respects, contradicted by 
the historical evidence. 
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The historical evidence establishes that inherent national 
sovereignty constitutionalism was a theory of the Constitution 
as prevalent and as influential in shaping and supporting the 
governance of the early republic as the constitutional theory of 
strict construction. The constitutional debates that arose in the 
nation’s early history between advocates of these conflicting 
theories, the decisions they made consistent or conflicting with 
these theories, the court decisions that decided questions of law 
arising from these theories and political decisions demonstrate 
beyond cavil that the original meaning of the Constitution was 
not fixed, as today’s new originalists insist, but was tentative, 
open-ended, and ever evolving. 
Proponents of national sovereignty constitutionalism thus 
defined the Constitution as a developmental, dynamically-
evolving framework of government which centered governing 
power primarily in Congress. Because they assumed that Con-
gress’s unenumerated powers to achieve the national govern-
ment’s ends and objects are vast and vary with changing cir-
cumstances, the Constitution could not possibly specify all of 
the powers Congress might exercise to fulfill its responsibility 
to provide for the nation’s needs and welfare. They understood 
the Constitution as an outline of government and governmental 
powers, and its meaning was to evolve over time within the po-
litical process of governing through the actions of the political 
branches of government. Consistent with the theory of popular 
sovereignty and republican political theory which underlie the 
Constitution, they insisted that Congress has the primary re-
sponsibility and authority to interpret the Constitution’s mean-
ing and the extent of the national government’s powers because 
the people delegated their sovereign lawmaking power and the 
primary responsibility to provide for the nation’s welfare to 
Congress. The Court is to defer to these judgments and to set 
them aside only if they are unequivocally contrary to the Con-
stitution or relate to individual rights. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 
shows that the Supreme Court unanimously adopted this in-
herent national sovereignty theory of the Constitution. As not-
ed within, the Court affirmed this theory in many other deci-
sions as well. The Court also expressly rejected the strict 
construction theory of the Constitution, consisting of fixed pow-
ers semantically understood, that is the prevailing constitu-
tional theory of the Supreme Court’s conservative Justices and 
of political conservatives. 
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Inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism is funda-
mentally different from today’s understanding of the Constitu-
tion, of the constitutional/political process, and of the relation-
ships of the branches of government within the constitutional 
structure. It entrusts much greater autonomy to Congress and 
the executive to govern and much greater authoritativeness to 
Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution in its function to 
make law and public policy than our system today allows. It 
envisions a more modest role for the judiciary in reviewing 
Congress’s legislative actions and the policies they entail. This 
theory centers policy making in the political branches of the 
government rather than in the Supreme Court where it cur-
rently exists. Moreover, inherent national sovereignty constitu-
tionalism relegates constitutional interpretation in making po-
litical decisions to a less important role and requires decision 
makers to justify their actions on their practical merits instead 
of the Constitution’s meaning. In short, inherent national sov-
ereignty constitutionalism presents a fundamentally different 
understanding of the way government should function under 
the Constitution. 
Although the constitutional/political system that the 
founders established is fundamentally different than today’s, 
according to a developmental theory of the Constitution, today’s 
system should be different than it was originally. But scholars 
and jurists should become aware of how the system has 
changed in order to assess which of these changes are worth-
while and defensible and which are not. 
